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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Equity  of  access  is  a key  policy  objective  in publicly-funded  healthcare  systems.  However,  observed
inequalities  of access  by  socioeconomic  status  may  result  from  differences  in  patients’  choices.  Using
data  on  non-emergency  coronary  revascularisation  procedures  in  the  English  National  Health  Service,  we
found substantive  differences  in waiting  times  within  public  hospitals  between  patients  with  different
socioeconomic  status:  up  to  35%  difference,  or 43 days,  between  the  most and  least  deprived  population
quintile  groups.  Using  selection  models  with  differential  distances  as  identiﬁcation  variables,  we esti-
mated  that only  up to 12%  of  these  waiting  time  inequalities  can  be  attributed  to patients’  choices  of
hospital  and type  of  treatment  (heart  bypass  versus  stent).  Residual  inequality,  after  allowing  for  choice,
was  economically  signiﬁcant:  patients  in  the  least  deprived  quintile  group  beneﬁted  from  shorter  waiting
times  and  the  associated  health  beneﬁts  were  worth  up  to £850  per person.eywords:
aiting times
nequalities
ocioeconomic status
election bias
© 2017  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.  This  is  an  open  access  article  under the  CC  BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).hoice
. Introduction
In the presence of public insurance and limited co-payments,
aiting times and waiting lists are used as a non-price rationing
echanism in several OECD countries (Martin and Smith, 1999;
iciliani et al., 2013). The main justiﬁcation for rationing public
ealthcare by waiting time, rather that price, is that this breaks
he link between access and ability to pay (Manning et al., 1987).
atients in equal need are supposed to wait their turn on a ‘ﬁrst-
ome, ﬁrst-served’ basis, irrespective of ability to pay − or, indeed,
ace, family background or other social characteristics that may
nﬂuence ability to pay. The price of accessing services to the
atient, such as reduced health-related quality of life while waiting
or treatment, is shared equally across patients of equal need. Wait-
ng lists are therefore perceived as a way of ensuring equal accessPlease cite this article in press as: Moscelli, G., et al., Socioeconomic ine
J. Health Econ. (2017), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2017.06.005
o public healthcare.
If richer patients wait less for public services than poorer
atients then waiting times are not as equitable as they appear.
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: giuseppe.moscelli@york.ac.uk (G. Moscelli).
ttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2017.06.005
167-6296/© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article 
/).A small but growing literature suggests that this may indeed be the
case in relation to waiting times for a number of routine, low-risk
hospital procedures (see Cooper et al., 2009, and Laudicella et al.,
2012, for England; Monstad et al., 2014, and Kaarboe and Carlsen,
2014, for Norway; Johar et al., 2013, and Sharma et al., 2013, for
Australia; and Siciliani, 2016, for a detailed overview). However,
it is not known whether these waiting time inequalities are due
to rich patients opting for providers with shorter waiting times
or receiving treatments with shorter waiting times. Policies aimed
at enhancing patient choice are increasingly popular in publicly-
funded Western healthcare systems, including England (Thomson
and Dixon, 2006). A better understanding of the effect of patient
choices on waiting time inequalities is required to allow for a more
complete assessment of the effect of these policies.
In this study, we  estimate the contribution of patients’ choice
behaviour to waiting time inequality for two  treatments for a
severe and costly disease that has not previously been examined
in the waiting time literature. Coronary heart disease was the
largest single cause of years of life lost in the UK in 2010 (Murrayquality of access to healthcare: Does choice explain the gradient?
et al., 2013) and consumed £1,9bn (just over 2%) of total pub-
lic healthcare expenditure in England in 2011/12 (NHS England,
2013). We  focus on two coronary revascularisation procedures,
under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.
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oronary artery bypass grafting (CABG) surgery and angioplasty
percutaneous coronary intervention, PCI), where patients have
ubstantially reduced quality of life and may  experience a non-
egligible risk of dying while waiting. Due to the existence of a
niversal publicly-funded health system – the National Health Ser-
ice (NHS) – most coronary revascularisation procedures of this
ind in England are carried out in public hospitals and we  are there-
ore able to exploit data on all publicly-funded procedures. Our
rior was that wait inequalities for coronary revascularisation are
egligible since we expect the management of the list to be rigorous
or a potentially life-threatening condition, and the health system
ore reluctant to let socioeconomically advantaged patients move
head in the queue.
Perhaps surprisingly, we ﬁnd instead economically large and
tatistically signiﬁcant differences in waiting times across socioe-
onomic groups. Patients living in more income-deprived (poorer)
reas wait longer than patients in less deprived areas that attend
he same hospital. In 2002 coronary bypass patients in the least
eprived quintile group waited 35% less (43 days) compared to the
ost deprived ones – considerably larger than the 8% differential
17 days) observed for hip replacement in 2001/02 (see Laudicella
t al., 2012). The gradient in waiting times gradually falls to 9.5% in
010, following the general reductions in waiting times at system
evel achieved by the English NHS in a sustained and costly ‘war on
aiting’ in the 2000s through additional funding and an aggressive
arget regime (Department of Health, 2000). Similar patterns are
bserved for angioplasty.
One key economic factor explaining differences in waiting times
y socioeconomic status (SES) is patient heterogeneity with respect
o choice of hospital and treatment. Patients with different SES
ay  differ in the way they exercise choice (either directly or medi-
ted through their GP), with richer and more educated individuals
eing more likely to travel further, either because they have a
tronger preference for shorter waiting times (and a higher quality)
r because they have fewer ﬁnancial or other constraints that limit
heir ability to travel. They may  also differ in risk and time prefer-
nces over different revascularisation procedures. Hence, SES may
ave both a direct effect on waiting time (e.g. through discrimina-
ion) and an indirect effect (operating through patients’ choices).
ailure to account for patients’ choices may  lead to self-selection
ias in estimates of the direct socioeconomic waiting time gradient.
Analytically, we allow for self-selection due to patient choice
hrough a switching regression (Roy) model which includes selec-
ion correction adjustments in each outcome equation (Heckman,
010). Patients have as many potential outcomes (i.e. different
aiting times) as there are alternative choices (i.e. whether they
ypass their local hospital or not; whether they are treated with
 coronary bypass or angioplasty). The realised outcome is asso-
iated with the choice that provides the highest latent utility. We
se exclusion criteria based on the differential distance between
he closest and second closest provider, which is a strong predic-
or of the probability of bypassing the local hospital (and in line
ith the seminal work by McClellan et al., 1994; and literature
hat followed). This approach is novel and has not been used in
he previous literature on waiting time inequalities. It allows us to
dentify how much of the socioeconomic gradient is explained by
hoice or self-selection. Conversely, the remainder of the gradient
s more likely to represent waiting times inequalities that originate
rom the doctor-patient relationship within the hospital and are,
hus, more amenable to regulatory intervention. Examples include
ospital specialists being more susceptible to pressure from indi-
iduals with higher SES, either directly or via their social networks,Please cite this article in press as: Moscelli, G., et al., Socioeconomic ine
J. Health Econ. (2017), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2017.06.005
r wealthier and more educated patients being more effective in
xpressing their needs. Alternatively, inequalities may  be due to
nconscious bias and ‘statistical discrimination’ by doctors (Van
yn and Burke, 2000; Balsa and McGuire, 2001). PRESS
conomics xxx (2017) xxx–xxx
Our key ﬁnding is that patients with higher SES are more likely
to exercise choice (directly or through the interaction with their GP)
by bypassing the local hospital, but that patients’ choices account
for only up to 12% of waiting time inequalities. The remaining SES
gradient is statistically and economically signiﬁcant. By adjusting
for choice,  we  recognise that we are adjusting for a combination
of the preferences and constraints that drive choice. To estimate
unfair inequality, it might be argued that the aim should be to
adjust purely for differences in preferences, rather than also for
differences in constraints that cause unequal opportunity to access
timely services (Roemer, 1998; Fleurbaey and Schokkaert, 2009).
If so, and insofar as the higher probability of deprived patients of
going to the local hospital (i.e. not bypassing the closest hospital) is
driven partly by constraints rather than preferences, then our esti-
mate of the degree of unfair inequality can be seen as a conservative
lower bound.
The study is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the insti-
tutional background. Section 3 presents the econometric methods.
Sections 4 and 5 describe respectively data and results. Section 6
provides some robustness checks. Section 7 concludes.
2. Institutional setting
During the period 2002–2010 the English NHS experienced a
phase of accelerated expenditure growth. This was  the result of a
perception that the NHS was  under-funded and that quality was
suffering as a result (Moran, 1999). A large investment plan was
designed and implemented, leading to a 50% increase in the allo-
cated budget and an approximately 33% increase in treatment
capacity over a ﬁve-year period starting in 2003. This included
funding for additional beds in existing hospitals, building of new
hospitals and care centres, as well as employment of additional
doctors, nurses and supporting staff.
Expenditure growth was accompanied by a number of major
healthcare reforms. One of the most effective reforms was the
implementation of centrally imposed waiting time targets with
associated penalties for failure (Department of Health, 2001, 2002b;
Commission for Health Improvement, 2003). This policy regime
was explicitly aimed at reducing excessive waiting times for
planned procedures. The maximum waiting time from addition to
the waiting list to admission was  gradually reduced from 18 months
to 12 months in 2003, 9 months in 2004 and 6 months in 2005. This
target was reformulated in 2010 and patients are now expected to
wait no longer than 18 weeks from primary care referral to treat-
ment (NHS England, 2013). The waiting time policy is a core part
of a performance management strategy that required hospitals to
meet targets to avoid regulatory interventions, either in the form
of a senior-management change or take-over by a better perform-
ing hospital. These strong incentives contributed to the decline of
waiting times for planned surgeries without measurable detriment
to quality (Propper et al., 2010).
During the same period, a policy allowing patients to choose
the hospital for planned treatment was  introduced in the English
NHS, with the aim of providing a competitive incentive for hos-
pitals to improve quality and responsiveness to citizens’ needs.
This policy was part of a broader attempt to modernize the pub-
lic sector by enhancing consumers’ choice, both in UK and other
countries (Besley and Ghatak, 2003; Pawson et al., 2006; Musset,
2012; Vrangbaek et al., 2012). The choice policy was rolled out in
phases between 2006 and 2008.
For life-threatening conditions, including those requiring revas-quality of access to healthcare: Does choice explain the gradient?
cularisation procedures such as CABG surgery and angioplasty, pilot
reforms offering a limited guarantee of patient choice were intro-
duced from July 2002 (Department of Health, 2002a). From that
date, patients who had been waiting for more than six months were
 ING ModelJ
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mechanism on the waiting time gradient.3
We model the choice of the hospital with a selection equation
for bypassing the closest hospital.4 Deﬁne nij as a dummy equal to
1 The estimated waiting times by income deprivation quintile are computed as
E[W |  y = g] =  ˆ × exp ( ˆˇ 1,g ), where  ˆ = (1/N)
∑
i
exp (εˆij) is the Duan smearing
estimator and g = 1, . . .,  5 is the income deprivation quintile (1 = most deprived).
2 For another application of switching regression methods, see for example
Pérotin et al. (2013), which investigates differences in patients’ satisfaction between
public and private providers.
3 We provide estimates of a joint (2 × 2) self-selection model for procedures and
hospital location in Appendix C. The key insights would be similar but the presen-ARTICLEHE-2027; No. of Pages 25
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iven the option to choose from a range of alternative providers.
he full choice reforms were then introduced from 2006, offering
hoice from the point of GP referral. In practice, however, patients
ave always been able to exercise a degree of choice via their GP,
ith well-informed patients more likely to inﬂuence their GP. The
hoice policy shifted the focus from the GP to the patient in making
his choice.
. Methods
.1. Baseline model without accounting for patient’s choices
We  wish to quantify the extent of socioeconomic inequality
n waiting time for NHS-funded elective surgery within English
HS hospitals, and its evolution over time. Our data are repeated
ross-sections of individuals receiving a given revascularisation
rocedure, i.e. either CABG surgery or PCI. Our ﬁrst econometric
trategy uses a linear model with hospital ﬁxed effects, estimated
eparately for each ﬁnancial year and revascularisation procedure.
The regression model is speciﬁed as:
ij = hj + ˇ1 ′yij + ˇ2 ′sij + ˇ3 ′xij + εij (1)
here wij = ln
(
Wij
)
and Wij is the waiting time of patient i in hos-
ital j. yij is a vector of dummy  variables capturing SES as measured
y income deprivation of the area where the patients resides. We
plit the income deprivation distribution into ﬁve quintiles, with
he highest indicating the least deprived areas (our reference cat-
gory). ˇ1 is the vector of coefﬁcients of interest. Income-related
nequalities favouring the rich arise if the elements of ˇ1 are posi-
ive.
The vector sij contains severity controls: age, gender, number
f secondary diagnoses, number of hospital emergency admissions
n the year preceding the procedure, and dummies for Charlson
o-morbidities (Charlson et al., 1987). These proxies control for
atients’ latent health status, which is unknown to the econometri-
ian but known to the doctor and/or the patient herself. Controlling
or severity and comorbidity is important because these are legiti-
ate reasons for higher priority on the waiting list which are also
negatively) correlated with income (Marmot et al., 1991; Smith,
999; Van Doorslaer et al., 2000; Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer,
000). The vector xij includes non-severity variables such as month
f admission.
hj is a vector of hospital ﬁxed effects. It controls for differences in
aiting times across hospitals which may  arise from unobserved
emand and supply factors, such as the number of beds, nurses,
octors, infrastructure, management and organization, and clinical
uality. Hence ˇ1 should be interpreted as waiting time inequalities
rising within a hospital, as opposed to across hospitals.
Throughout the study we only present results which include
ospital ﬁxed effects and therefore focus on socioeconomic
nequalities arising within the hospital rather than across hospitals.
his is because in England the waiting time gradient hardly changes
hen we control for hospital ﬁxed effects and when we do not
results available on request). This suggests that poorer individuals
re not systematically located nearby hospitals with longer waiting
imes, and that waiting time inequalities arise within as opposed to
cross hospitals. This is not necessarily the case for other countries.
ohar et al. (2013) show that in Australia about half of the waiting
ime inequalities are across hospitals and about half are within hos-
itals suggesting that poor patients have access to hospitals with
ong waits.Please cite this article in press as: Moscelli, G., et al., Socioeconomic ine
J. Health Econ. (2017), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2017.06.005
εij is the idiosyncratic error. We  estimate Eq. (1) through
LS with Huber-White standard errors robust to unknown het-
roscedasticity. We  use the logarithm of waiting time as the
ependent variable to reduce the skewness of its distribution. We PRESS
conomics xxx (2017) xxx–xxx 3
calculate estimates of the waiting time inequalities on the natural
scale by employing a Duan smearing adjustment (Duan, 1983).1
3.2. Endogenous switching regressions with selection correction
Despite the hospital ﬁxed effects and the extensive controls on
severity, the OLS estimation of Eq. (1) of the income gradient ˇ1
coefﬁcients does not account for the presence of sample selection
(Heckman, 1979). We consider two  types of selection mechanisms:
choice of hospital and type of treatment.
We may  expect more deprived patients to be less willing to
travel or experience more difﬁculties in travelling compared to less
deprived patients, and therefore to be more likely to seek care in the
closest hospital. Hence, some of the observable differences in wait-
ing time across SES groups (within the same hospital) may  be the
result of heterogeneity in preferences or constraints to the ability
to travel. The waiting-time differential may  increase non-linearly
if more deprived patients are also unobservably sicker than less
deprived ones.
Revascularisation procedures also have different risk/beneﬁt
proﬁles: CABG surgery carries a higher risk of short-term mortality
but also exhibits better long-term survival rates and post-operative
quality of life than PCI for patients older than 65 or those with cer-
tain co-morbidities such as diabetes (The BARI investigators, 1996,
2007; Hlatky et al., 2009; Taggart, 2009). We  have proxies of patient
health status and severity as control variables but cannot observe
the exact patient pathology. Furthermore, even for a given pathol-
ogy, PCI and CABG may  still be substitutes for some patient proﬁles
(Grifﬁn et al., 2007; Dalton et al., 2016), and patients’ risk and time
preferences may  thus determine the choice of treatment. The two
procedures have different in-hospital lengths of stay (two days for
PCI; nine days for CABG), which implies different opportunity costs.
Whether less deprived patients have higher or lower opportunity
costs is a priori ambiguous. On one hand, less deprived patients
forgo higher wages. On the other hand, they may  have lower time
preference discount rates (e.g. because they are not in precarious
employment and thus less likely to lose their job due to absence),
and so be more likely to undergo a CABG procedure, if they perceive
it as a procedure delivering greater long-run health beneﬁts and
longevity despite imposing greater short-term risk, inconvenience
and loss of time.
We estimate Roy model regressions (Roy, 1951; Heckman and
Honore, 1990; Heckman, 2010), also known as switching regression
models, with a correction term to control for self-selection that is
due to patients choosing i) a hospital which is different from the
local one, and ii) a revascularisation procedure (coronary bypass
versus PCI).2 We  model and estimate the two choices separately,
as we are interested in the separate effect of each self-selectionquality of access to healthcare: Does choice explain the gradient?
tation of the results more involved.
4 We do not model the choice among all hospitals, but focus only on whether
the  patient bypassed the local provider. This reduces computational burden and
is  realistic given the high market concentration of revascularisation procedures.
Moreover, it allows us to formulate our empirical models in a purely counterfactual
 ING ModelJ
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pute for each individual patient the difference between i) the
average distance from patient address to the three closest hospitals
offering CABG and ii) the average distance from patient address to
6 We have also considered alternative exclusion restrictions based on other geo-
graphical variables, e.g. the number of hospitals within a ﬁxed radius from the
patient’s residence, or the rurality of patient’s residence. However these other vari-
ables are likely to affect directly the outcome of interest (waiting times), thus not
constituting valid exclusion restrictions. Moreover, Newey (1999) shows that one
valid exclusion restriction is sufﬁcient for the consistent estimation of sample selec-
tion models with non-Gaussian error terms.
7 The results from the probit regression in the Roy model (presented below in
Tables 5 and 6) show that differential distance between the second and the ﬁrst
closest hospitals is a strong predictor of the propensity of the patient to bypass or
not  the closest hospital, for both CABG and PCI treatments.
8 While the differential distance between the two closest hospitals is a good pre-
dictor of the choice of bypassing the ﬁrst closest hospital, such difference is unlikely
to have a direct effect on the individual waiting time outcome. To our knowledge,ARTICLEHE-2027; No. of Pages 25
 G. Moscelli et al. / Journal of H
 if the patient bypasses the closest hospital and 0 otherwise. The
oy model is then deﬁned as
n
ij
= I(0 ′zij + 1 ′yij + 2 ′sij + 3 ′xij + ij > 0),  nij = {0, 1},
w∗
ijn
= w
ij1
= hj + ˇ1,1 ′yij1 + ˇ2,1 ′sij1 + ˇ3,1 ′xij1 + εij1, if nij = 1,
w∗
ijn
= w
ij0
= hj + ˇ1,0 ′yij0 + ˇ2,0 ′sij0 + ˇ3,0 ′xij0 + εij0 , if nij = 0
(2)
here w
ij1 and wij0 represent the observed log waiting times for
atients selecting respectively into the non-closest or closest hos-
ital, and w∗
ijn
is the latent waiting time outcome for every patient
efore self-selecting into a given hospital.
The estimating equations of this model are
ij = I
(
0
′
zij + 1
′
yij + 2
′
sij + 3
′
xij + ij > 0
)
, nij =
{
0, 1
}
(3){
wij1|hj, yij1, sij1, xij1, pˆz
}
= hj + ˇ1,1
′yij1 + ˇ2,1
′sij1 + ˇ3,1
′xij1 + 1ij1
(
pˆz
)
(4)
{
wij0|hj, yij0, sij0, xij0, pˆz
}
= hj + ˇ1,0
′yij0 + ˇ2,0
′sij0 + ˇ3,1
′xij0 + 0ij0
(
pˆz
)
(5)
The unobserved error terms v, ε0, ε1 follow a degener-
te trivariate Gaussian distribution, i.e. (v, ε0, ε1)∼TN(0,  ˝n),
ith mean zero and covariance matrix n, where ˝n =
2v ε0 ε1
ε0 2ε0 ·
ε1 · 2ε1
]
. The covariance between 1 and 0 is not deﬁned,
s w1 and w0 are both potential outcomes of which only one can
e observed at any time.
Patients are assumed to self-select into the hospital that
rovides the highest latent utility (Eq. (3)). Their choice is poten-
ially driven by all factors affecting waiting times, i.e. severity,
o-morbidities, age, other patient characteristics and income depri-
ation. We  observe Eq. (4) when patients bypass the closest hospital
nd Eq. (5) when not. No hospital ﬁxed effect is included in the
election equation. Hospital ﬁxed effects would be endogenous in
 selection equation for the choice of bypassing the closest hospital
ecause the share of patients choosing a given hospital (i.e hos-
ital ﬁxed effect) is a function of whether the hospital is close by
dependent variable). Similarly, we do not include average hospi-
al quality or waiting times in the choice equation, as they would
ehave as a hospital ﬁxed effect. As such, the unobserved varia-
ion in the choice outcome due to hospital characteristics (quality,
aiting times) is included in the residuals vij . This variation is then
ontrolled for in the waiting time outcome Eqs. (4) and (5) by the
election correction terms 1(pˆ) and 0(pˆ).5
The model can be identiﬁed through nonlinearities (Cameron
nd Trivedi, 2005), but it is good practice to include at least
ne exclusion restriction variable (instrument) in the selection
quation to avoid collinearity problems in the outcome equation
Newey, 1999). Our instrument zij measures the difference in the
istances between the closest and the second closest hospital for
 given procedure from the patient’s area of residence (which we
efer to as ‘ﬁrst’ and ‘second’ available hospital). It is therefore based
n distances from the patient’s residence to the location of the
two) closest hospitals. Such computation is based on the geograph-
cal coordinates corresponding to the hospital postcodes, and thePlease cite this article in press as: Moscelli, G., et al., Socioeconomic ine
J. Health Econ. (2017), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2017.06.005
eographical coordinates of the small area level (LSOA) where the
atient resides. The ordering of hospitals is based on the distance to
he patient’s residence. Patients are expected to choose the closest
ramework in which the patient is faced with only two  alternatives. We  expect that
his simpliﬁcation has no substantial effect on our results.
5 Model (2) therefore accounts both for the within hospitals variation in waiting
imes and for the correlation between waiting times and self-selection patterns due
o  the differences in average hospitals characteristics (average waits, quality). PRESS
conomics xxx (2017) xxx–xxx
hospital, all else equal. The instrument is therefore not based on
the distance to the hospital chosen by the patient.6
The differential distance between the closest and second closest
provider is a measure of the relative opportunity cost of attending
different hospitals. The use of differential distance as a source of
exogenous variation (and therefore suitable instrumental variable
or exclusion restriction variable) has been introduced in the health
economics literature by the seminal work of McClellan et al. (1994;
see also Newhouse and McClellan, 1998). Subsequently, it has been
applied in different contexts, e.g. on the effect of hospital ownership
on quality (Sloan et al., 2001; Shen, 2002; Lien et al., 2008).7 Patients
are assumed not to have chosen where to reside on the basis of
expected waiting time for a treatment for which they face uncertain
demand in the future.8
We  estimate the model in two steps (Brave and Walstrum,
2014). We  ﬁrst retrieve the propensity score p (Rosenbaum and
Rubin, 1983) from the estimation of a probit model for the selec-
tion equation. The selection correction terms for the two outcome
equations are then computed as 1
(
pˆz
)
= 	
[
˚−1
(
pˆz
)]
/
[
1 − pˆz
]
and 0
(
pˆz
)
= −	
[
˚−1
(
pˆz
)]
/
[
pˆz
]
. In the second step, two  sepa-
rate equations for the waiting time outcomes are estimated, one
for each regime of hospital choice (closest versus not closest).
Selection correction for the two conditional means is addressed by
the terms 1
(
pˆ
)
and 0
(
pˆ
)
. Non-zero coefﬁcients on these terms
indicate self-selection. Estimation is performed by OLS on the orig-
inal covariates plus the selection correction term. Standard errors
are bootstrapped to account for the two-step estimation process
(Murphy and Topel, 2002).
Including hospital ﬁxed-effects hj in the waiting times equations
of the Roy model is crucial to identify the within-hospital waiting-
times gradient due to SES. We include hospital effects that are equal
in the two  switching regimes because they represent unobservable
supply or quality shifters that are valid for the same hospital, inde-
pendently on the choice of the patient. Hence we constrain the
hospital-level effects to be the same as those estimated by OLS in
Eq. (1).
We estimate a similar Roy model for the choice between CABG
surgery and PCI, with analogous speciﬁcations and distributional
assumptions of the error terms. As exclusion restriction, we  com-quality of access to healthcare: Does choice explain the gradient?
there is no evidence of residential sorting for hospital care in England. It is possible
that patients in need of repeated treatments, like haemodialysis or chemother-
apy, are more likely to locate closer to hospitals to minimize travel. But patients
are less likely to change their residence for one-off treatments like CABG or PCI.
Moreover, even if patients did marginally sort their residence according to distance
and/or average waiting times of the ﬁrst closest hospital, they would be less likely
to  choose their residence according to distances and average waiting times of both
the  ﬁrst and the second closest hospitals. As such, it is plausible that the differential
distances between second and ﬁrst closest hospitals constitutes a valid exclusion
restriction variable with respect to waiting times, especially as the exogeneity has
to hold just conditional on the covariates included in the selection equation (i.e.
weak exogeneity).
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he three closest hospitals offering PCI.9 Ceteris paribus, the patient
s assumed to select the procedure with the ‘highest availability’ in
er location. If hospitals providing CABG surgery are further away
rom the patient than PCI providers, the patient is more likely to
hoose PCI to reduce her travel costs.10 In this case, we  allow for
ifferent hospital ﬁxed-effects in the waiting time equations, hj1
nd hj0, as the unobserved supply factors that we  want to con-
rol for might have different impact on the two  revascularization
rocedures.
.3. Estimates of patients’ welfare loss due to waiting
Waiting causes disutility to the patient, mostly because health
eneﬁts are postponed and suffering is prolonged. We  estimate the
onetary value of the health forgone due to waiting for revas-
ularisation treatment to quantify the re-distributing effect of
ocioeconomic inequality in waiting time. The estimated cost of
aiting, Mg , for deprivation group g = Q1, ..., Q5 (with Q1 the most
nd Q5 the least deprived groups), is computed as
ˆ g = E [M|y  = g] = 
U  × Wˆg × WTP (U) (6)
here Wˆg are the estimates of the waiting times by deprivation
uintiles, and U  is the change in the patient’s utility (due to health
ains) following revascularisation. WTP (U) is the willingness to
ay for one year of life in full health (standardised to one utility
nit), currently assumed to be £60,000 by the English Department
f Health (2013).11,12 We  utilise a common WTP  estimate for all
ocioeconomic groups to ensure comparability.
. Data
We  use data from Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) for the nine
nancial years (April to March) 2002/03 to 2010/11. HES is anPlease cite this article in press as: Moscelli, G., et al., Socioeconomic ine
J. Health Econ. (2017), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2017.06.005
dministrative dataset containing records of all NHS-funded hos-
ital admissions in England.13 The sample includes all elective
atients admitted for CABG surgery or PCI.14 We  exclude duplicates,
9 Formally, deﬁne d3,CABG (d3,PCI) respectively as the average distance from each
atient’s address and the address of the three closest hospitals providing elective
ABG (PCI). The exclusion restriction variable for each patient is 
d3 = d3,CABG −
3,PCI .
10 The set of English hospitals providing elective CABG surgery is substantially
maller compared to PCIs. While in 2002 the number of hospitals was  similar (32
or  CABG and 37 for PCI), by 2010 the number of hospitals offering PCIs had more
han doubled (32 for CABG and 83 for PCI). For only about 30% of the patients in
ur sample the nearest three hospitals offer both PCI and CABG surgery, so there is
ubstantial variation in our exclusion restriction variable.
11 A similar ﬁgure is provided by Ryen and Svensson (2014).
12 
U is computed as the discounted utility of the patients’ health status six
ears after revascularization treatment minus the discounted utility associated with
eceiving medical management treatment (i.e. no intervention). The discounted util-
ties  from CABG and PCI are respectively 0.69 and 0.65, while the utility from medical
anagement is 0.54, according to estimates from Grifﬁn et al. (2007).
13 We do not have information regarding privately insured or self-funded patients
ho  are treated by private sector hospitals. The private sector accounted for only
.1% (6.8%) of planned CABG (PCI) interventions during the years 2008/2011 in Eng-
and (Ludman, 2012; NICOR, 2012). If we  assume that private treatment is sought
ainly by the wealthiest patients, living in the least income deprived areas, our
stimates of the income-deprivation gradient on waiting times will be downward
iased.
14 We deﬁne elective patients as all non-emergency patients classiﬁed in HES
s  booked, waiting list or planned patients. We  identify as CABG patients those
aving a K40-K46 OPCS-4 procedure code, excluding patients treated contem-
oraneously with a PCI or a heart valve procedure (codes K25-K38). We identify
s PCI patients those not treated with a CABG procedure, and having a K49-
50  or a K75 or K508 and K718 OPCS-4 within their treatments. For reference,
ee also: https://indicators.ic.nhs.uk/download/NCHOD/Speciﬁcation/Spec 09F
11ISR1CPP2 12 V1.pdf (updated February 2014). PRESS
conomics xxx (2017) xxx–xxx 5
incomplete admission records, or records with missing information
on important covariates. Elective inpatient waiting time measures
the total time between the patient being added to the waiting list
and being admitted to hospital for treatment. We extract infor-
mation on patients’ age, gender, month of admission, and severity
controls (see Section 3.1).
We approximate socioeconomic status through the income
domain of the Economic Deprivation Index (EDI) (Gill, 2012). The
EDI measures the proportion of people aged 18–59 in each of
the 32,482 small areas in England (Lower Super Output Areas
(LSOAs), with about 1500 residents) who are living in low-income
households (more speciﬁcally, beneﬁt units) that are claiming
out-of-work means-tested social security beneﬁts (either Income
Support (IS) or income-based Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA-IB)). The
data are provided per quarter and aggregated at annual level. EDI is
comparable over the study period since it accounts for changes to
the tax and beneﬁt systems over time. LSOAs are ranked according
to the level of economic deprivation in each year. We  generate a
set of dummy variables, corresponding to the ﬁve quintile groups
of the income deprivation distribution at LSOA level in each year of
the sample.
Straight-line distances are computed between the centroid of
patients’ LSOA of residence (available in HES) and the postcode
of the relevant hospitals in a given year through their geographic
coordinates. For each patient and procedure, we  compute the dif-
ferential distance between the closest hospital and the second
closest hospital (which we  use in the selection equation of bypass-
ing the closest hospital). For each patient, we  also compute the
difference between i) the average distance from patient address
to the three closest hospitals offering CABG and ii) the average dis-
tance from patient address to the three closest hospitals offering PCI
(see footnote 9 for a formal deﬁnition). The hospital choice sets for
patients are computed separately by procedure and then merged.
5. Results
5.1. Descriptive statistics
More than 320,000 publicly-funded, elective revascularisation
procedures have been performed in the English NHS over the period
2002–2010 (Table 1). The number of PCIs has increased markedly
over time and the number of CABG surgery has fallen, which sug-
gests that the two  procedures are potentially substitutes.
Waiting times for both procedures have declined sharply over
time (Table 1). Fig. 1(a) and (b) illustrate the trends in the average
waiting time by income deprivation for the two revascularisation
procedures. PCI patients living in the most deprived LSOAs (Q1)
waited longer that those patients living in the least deprived areas
(Q5) in all years. This is also true for CABG patients until 2008. From
2008 the most deprived patients received treatment more quickly
compared to the least deprived.
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics of the patient sample. Both
PCI and CABG patients are on average 64–65 years old and over
three quarters are male. PCI patients have fewer comorbidities and
have been admitted to hospital as an emergency more frequently in
the preceding year compared to CABG patients. Both patient groups
exhibit a similar socioeconomic composition. The average distance
travelled to the chosen hospital is higher for CABG patients (32 km)
than for PCI patients (26 km)  since fewer hospitals offer this pro-
cedure. More than 35% of all patients have bypassed the closest
hospital.quality of access to healthcare: Does choice explain the gradient?
The exclusion restriction variables (discussed in Section 3.2) are
based on differential distance between the closest and second clos-
est hospital, and are reported at the bottom of Table 2. For patients
who underwent CABG surgery, the average difference between the
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Table 1
Treated patients and average waiting times by year and procedure.
Years PCI CABG surgery
Patients Treated Average waiting time (days) Patients treated Average waiting time (days)
Pooled sample 211,589 57.6 109,487 83.2
2002  16,099 89.8 14,661 153.5
2003  20,144 93.0 14,219 106.1
2004  24,358 83.7 14,074 98.3
2005  25,632 56.5 12,060 65.4
2006  26,775 52.5 11,536 65.9
2007  25,553 44.3 12,218 64.4
2008  25,404 37.4 
2009  23,862 40.0 
2010  23,762 39.2 
Table 2
Sample descriptive statistics by procedure.
Mean PCI Mean CABG
Waiting Times (days) 57.57 83.17
EDI Income – 1st Quintile (most deprived) 18.66% 19.13%
EDI Income – 2nd Quintile 19.70% 20.09%
EDI Income – 3rd Quintile 20.89% 20.89%
EDI Income – 4th Quintile 20.92% 20.82%
EDI Income – 5th Quintile 19.82% 19.07%
Patient bypasses the closest hospital 38.61% 35.96%
Number of diagnosis 4.37 5.72
Emergency utilization in the past 365 days 0.37 0.28
Patient age 64.09 65.33
Patient is female 25.85% 18.09%
Distance between patient’s LSOA and chosen
hospital (km)
24.53 32.41
Congestive Heart Failure 2.45% 7.09%
Peripheral Vascular Disease 4.16% 7.36%
Cerebrovascular Disease 0.63% 2.74%
Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease 7.01% 8.55%
Rheumatoid Disease 0.86% 0.99%
Peptic Ulcer Disease 0.17% 0.43%
Mild Liver Disease 0.16% 0.19%
Diabetes 16.76% 20.76%
Diabetes & Complications 0.59% 0.98%
Renal Disease 2.52% 3.48%
Cancer 0.73% 0.82%
Admission Month: January 8.31% 8.53%
Admission Month: February 8.48% 8.06%
Admission Month: March 9.19% 8.62%
Admission Month: April 7.79% 8.14%
Admission Month: May 7.76% 8.26%
Admission Month: June 8.74% 8.92%
Admission Month: July 8.80% 8.79%
Admission Month: August 7.96% 8.50%
Admission Month: September 8.54% 8.72%
Admission Month: October 8.67% 8.72%
Admission Month: November 9.01% 8.52%
Admission Month: December 6.75% 6.23%
Distance between the closest and second
closest hospital (CABG)
22.15
Distance between the closest and second
closest hospital (PCI)
16.07
Difference in distances to the closest CABG
and PCI hospitals*
12.92 10.80
Notes. EDI = Economic Deprivation Index. * Difference between i) the average dis-
tance from patient address to the three closest hospitals offering CABG and ii) the
average distance from patient address to the three closest hospitals offering PCI.
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Tables 5 and 6 show the effect of income deprivation on wait-
ing times accounting for self-selection due to bypassing the closest
hospital.16 CABG and PCI patients are analysed separately. In almost
15 Differences in trends shown in Fig. 1(a) and (c) are due to covariate adjustment.
Fig. 1(a) shows the mean of the actual (i.e. observed) waiting times, stratiﬁed by
income deprivation quintiles. Fig. 1(c) shows the conditional mean waiting times
by  income deprivation quintiles that are obtained from the regression model con-
trolling for case-mix. The divergence between ﬁgures after 2007 is driven by the
case-mix adjustment; not to the smearing adjustment. The latter is set to be con-
stant within procedures and equal across deprivation quintiles in order to allow for
comparison.
16 We also formally test for the hypothesis of switching regimes by revasculari-
sation procedure and by choice of closest hospital bypassing, through a Chow testlosest and second closest hospital is 22 km,  and for a quarter of
atients exceeds 42 km.  For patients who had PCI the differential
istance between the closest and second closest hospital is 16 km
nd exceeds 33 km for a quarter of patients.
Table A1 in the Appendix shows mean waiting time, proportionPlease cite this article in press as: Moscelli, G., et al., Socioeconomic ine
J. Health Econ. (2017), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2017.06.005
f patients bypassing the closest hospital, and mean differential
istance by procedure, year and quintile of the EDI distribution.11,831 57.8
10,000 49.5
8888 50.4
5.2. Socioeconomic gradient, not accounting for patients’ choices
Tables 3 and 4 show the effect of income deprivation on waiting
time for CABG and PCI patients, respectively. These results control
for a number of factors but are not adjusted for self-selection. The
inequality gradient is statistically signiﬁcant at 1% level for the two
most deprived income quintiles in each year for PCI and for most
years for CABG.
Fig. 1(c) and (d) plot conditional waiting times in days, after
applying a Duan smearing adjustment. In 2002, CABG patients who
were most deprived waited 48 days ([188.9-140.7]/140.7 = 34%)
longer than the least deprived patients. The effect reduced over
time, but remained between 18% and 10% in all years after 2005. The
relative waiting time inequality is larger for patients who  under-
went PCI. In 2002, patients who  were most deprived waited 53%
longer than the least deprived patients. The gap is at least 18% in
all years up to 2007 and at least 12% thereafter.15
Most of the case-mix variables showed the expected sign and
were statistically signiﬁcant in most speciﬁcations. In particular,
the effect of the number of past hospital emergency admissions in
the previous year is negative and signiﬁcant at 1% level for both
CABG and PCI patients, which is consistent with prioritisation on
severity. Conversely, covariates like age and the number of sec-
ondary co-morbidity diagnosis are not always signiﬁcant and are
often associated with longer waiting times. The unexpected sign
may indicate that these variables do not proxy severity related to
cardiovascular pathology under treatment but reﬂect other unob-
served factors that may prolong waits (e.g. propensity to miss
outpatient appointments), or may  require postponing revascular-
ization treatment (e.g. co-morbidities not yet adequately treated).
We  also estimated quintile regression models and found a sim-
ilar pattern of inequalities at different percentiles of the waiting
time distribution (see Appendix E).
5.3. Switching regression for bypassing the closest hospitalquality of access to healthcare: Does choice explain the gradient?
(Chow, 1960); and for the common support of the propensity score across self-
selection arms, via histograms. Results are reported respectively in Appendices B
Please cite this article in press as: Moscelli, G., et al., Socioeconomic inequality of access to healthcare: Does choice explain the gradient?
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Table  3
Effect of income deprivation (quintiles of yearly income deprivation distribution) on the log of CABG waiting times, by year.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
EDI income 1st quintile (most deprived) 0.2942*** 0.2333*** 0.1681*** 0.1346*** 0.1627*** 0.1260*** 0.0702** 0.0779*** 0.0921**
EDI  income 2nd quintile 0.2092*** 0.1871*** 0.1013*** 0.1150*** 0.1451*** 0.1623*** 0.0656** 0.0819*** 0.0935**
EDI  income 3rd quintile 0.1529*** 0.0903** 0.1341*** 0.0983*** 0.0834** 0.0724*** 0.0485* 0.0270 0.0648*
EDI  income 4th quintile 0.0221 0.0582* 0.0528** 0.0628** 0.0343 0.0947*** 0.0279 0.0081 0.0326
Constant 4.2215*** 4.0960*** 4.0651*** 3.6726*** 3.7363*** 3.6791*** 3.6018*** 3.4662*** 3.4424***
Patient Age (demeaned) 0.0007 0.0024 0.0055 0.0001 0.0034 0.0040 0.0016 −0.0012 0.0065**
Female Patient 0.0684** 0.0658** 0.0544*** 0.0537** 0.0363 0.0390* 0.0613*** 0.0658** −0.0078
Num.  of Diagnosis −0.0005 0.0198** 0.0099* 0.0129** 0.0057 0.0151*** 0.0163*** 0.0067 0.0063
Emergency Past Admissions past year −0.2736*** −0.2428*** −0.2050*** −0.1316*** −0.1132*** −0.1181*** −0.1274*** −0.0668*** −0.0808***
Patients 14654 14213 14074 12060 11536 12218 11829 10000 8888
Hospital Sites 32 35 34 32 32 33 34 32 32
R2 0.19 0.19 0.12 0.13 0.17 0.22 0.17 0.17 0.15
Notes. Controls: Age, age bands dummies, admission month, Charlson comorbidities dummies, gender, number of secondary diagnoses, past emergency utilization, hospital
ﬁxed  effects. EDI = Economic Deprivation Index. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 4
Effect of income deprivation (quintiles of yearly income deprivation distribution) on log of PCI waiting times, by year.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
EDI income 1st quintile (most deprived) 0.4231*** 0.3164*** 0.2306*** 0.1637*** 0.1688*** 0.1667*** 0.1098*** 0.1217*** 0.1381***
EDI  income 2nd quintile 0.3402*** 0.2654*** 0.1980*** 0.1581*** 0.1638*** 0.1204*** 0.0954*** 0.1186*** 0.1193***
EDI  income 3rd quintile 0.2402*** 0.1569*** 0.1102*** 0.1164*** 0.1171*** 0.0924*** 0.0986*** 0.0887*** 0.0966***
EDI  income 4th quintile 0.1078*** 0.0931*** 0.0487** 0.0361* 0.0667*** 0.0667*** 0.0520*** 0.0539** 0.0490**
Constant 3.7968*** 3.9128*** 3.9489*** 3.5820*** 3.5585*** 3.2195*** 3.2286*** 3.1844*** 3.2231***
Patient Age (demeaned) −0.0004 0.0039 0.0012 0.0016 0.0039*** 0.0040** 0.0035** 0.0025 0.0001
Female Patient 0.1062*** 0.0673*** 0.0691*** 0.0501*** 0.0467*** 0.0490*** 0.0389*** 0.0281*** 0.0184*
Num.  of Diagnosis 0.0254** 0.0256** 0.0168* 0.0232*** 0.0192*** 0.0225** 0.0153*** 0.0196*** 0.0223***
Emergency Past Admissions past year −0.1973*** −0.1844*** −0.1282*** −0.0895*** −0.0842*** −0.0628*** −0.0402*** −0.0271*** −0.0219**
Patients 16095 20140 24355 25632 26772 25545 25399 23861 23759
Hospital Sites 37 42 44 52 60 66 73 76 83
R2 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.15 0.16 0.18 0.16
Notes. Controls: Age, age bands dummies, admission month, Charlson comorbidities dummies, gender, number of secondary diagnoses, past emergency utilization, hospital
ﬁxed  effects. EDI = Economic Deprivation Index. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table 5
Roy model. Income inequalities in CABG waiting times, accounting for selection of hospital.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Patients not choosing the closest CABG hospital site – Eq. (4)
EDI income 1st quintile 0.1671*** 0.2229*** 0.2274*** 0.0818* 0.1429*** 0.1636*** 0.0153 0.0976** 0.0660
EDI  income 2nd quintile 0.1086** 0.1947*** 0.0856* 0.0797* 0.1353*** 0.1760*** 0.0150 0.1095** 0.1583***
EDI  income 3rd quintile 0.0474 0.0807* 0.1564*** 0.0716* 0.0690 0.1062*** 0.0421 0.0724 0.0227
EDI  income 4th quintile −0.0035 0.0691 0.0381 0.0272 0.0104 0.1395*** 0.0076 0.0265 0.0484
IMR1  – Not closest 0.1277** 0.1970*** 0.2664*** 0.0086 −0.0465 0.0187 0.1122** 0.0505 −0.0653
Constant 4.3941*** 4.1392*** 4.3827*** 3.7694*** 3.7312*** 3.6206*** 3.6255*** 3.6014*** 3.3693***
Patients choosing the closest CABG hospital site – Eq. (5)
EDI income 1st quintile 0.3666*** 0.2527*** 0.1469*** 0.1687*** 0.1762*** 0.1089*** 0.1114*** 0.0692** 0.1020***
EDI  income 2nd quintile 0.2711*** 0.1846*** 0.1166*** 0.1405*** 0.1523*** 0.1535*** 0.0985*** 0.0708** 0.0608*
EDI  income 3rd quintile 0.2172*** 0.1045*** 0.1287*** 0.1172*** 0.0933*** 0.0514* 0.0689** 0.0057 0.0847**
EDI  income 4th quintile 0.0427 0.0577 0.0690** 0.0883*** 0.0513 0.0693** 0.0433 −0.0009 0.0265
IMR0  – Closest −0.0174 −0.0091 −0.0988** −0.0172 0.0281 −0.0234 0.0522 0.0014 0.0719**
Constant 4.1892*** 4.1937*** 4.0696*** 3.6239*** 3.7021*** 3.7343*** 3.6118*** 3.4253*** 3.4176***
1st Stage Probit for Choice of provider by distance: CLOSEST vs NOT CLOSEST hospital – only CABG – Eq. (3)
Distance difference 2nd – 1st provider −0.0339*** −0.0184*** −0.0182*** −0.0316*** −0.0366*** −0.0282*** −0.0318*** −0.0329*** −0.0380***
EDI  income 1st quintile −0.1832*** −0.2132*** −0.2065*** −0.2825*** −0.3233*** −0.2321*** −0.2405*** −0.1738*** −0.1348***
EDI  income 2nd quintile −0.0185 −0.0361 −0.0186 −0.0800** −0.0185 −0.0854** −0.0165 −0.0561 −0.0017
EDI  income 3rd quintile −0.0233 −0.0503 −0.0229 −0.0110 −0.0868** −0.0273 −0.0725* 0.0130 0.0187
EDI  income 4th quintile −0.0265 −0.0171 −0.0426 −0.0313 −0.0706* −0.0546 0.0397 0.0268 0.0591
Constant 0.2726*** 0.1231** 0.0626 0.2071*** 0.2775*** 0.1454** 0.1883*** 0.1853*** 0.2735***
Patients 14654 14213 14074 12060 11536 12218 11829 10000 8888
Chi-squared p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pseudo R2 0.14 0.08 0.09 0.15 0.18 0.13 0.15 0.14 0.18
Notes. Roy model on CABG sample based on Model (2). Exclusion restriction in the 1st stage regression: differential distance between second closest and closest CABG hospital
site.  Controls: Age, age bands dummies, admission month, Charlson comorbidities dummies, Gender, Number of diagnosis, Emergency Past utilization in the previous year,
hospital ﬁxed effects (excluded in 1st stage probit choice). IMR  = Parametric selection correction (Inverse Mills Ratio). EDI = Economic Deprivation Index. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,
***  p < 0.01.
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Fig. 1. Actual and estimated absolute and percentage income-related inequalities in waiting times over years 2002/2010.
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Table  6
Roy model. Income inequalities in PCI waiting times, accounting for selection of hospital.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Patients not choosing the closest PCI hospital site – Eq. (4)
EDI income 1st quintile 0.4043*** 0.2845*** 0.1846*** 0.1478*** 0.1422*** 0.2120*** 0.1269*** 0.1496*** 0.1425***
EDI  income 2nd quintile 0.3251*** 0.2956*** 0.1930*** 0.1516*** 0.1340*** 0.1537*** 0.1314*** 0.1612*** 0.1119***
EDI  income 3rd quintile 0.2375*** 0.1595*** 0.0912*** 0.1169*** 0.0881*** 0.1424*** 0.1174*** 0.1277*** 0.0824***
EDI  income 4th quintile 0.071 0.0890** 0.0013 0.0474* 0.0645** 0.1115*** 0.0717*** 0.0980*** 0.0771***
IMR1  – Not Closest −0.1001** −0.0272 −0.0386 −0.0018 −0.0648** −0.0106 −0.0575** 0.0263 −0.0054
Constant 3.5600*** 3.8989*** 3.8665*** 3.5116*** 3.4935*** 3.1513*** 3.1757*** 3.2392*** 3.2156***
Patients choosing the closest PCI hospital site – Eq. (5)
EDI income 1st quintile 0.4344*** 0.3219*** 0.2493*** 0.1747*** 0.1841*** 0.1363*** 0.1004*** 0.1090*** 0.1374***
EDI  income 2nd quintile 0.3447*** 0.2394*** 0.1992*** 0.1634*** 0.1868*** 0.0966*** 0.0735*** 0.0946*** 0.1228***
EDI  income 3rd quintile 0.2412*** 0.1471*** 0.1204*** 0.1171*** 0.1362*** 0.0537** 0.0855*** 0.0689*** 0.1061***
EDI  income 4th quintile 0.1292*** 0.0909*** 0.0735*** 0.0292 0.0654*** 0.0333 0.0400* 0.0301 0.0336
IMR0  – Closest 0.1104*** 0.0279 −0.0073 −0.0035 −0.0267 −0.0093 −0.0102 0.0286 0.0037
Constant 3.8188*** 3.9022*** 3.9710*** 3.6293*** 3.5824*** 3.2653*** 3.2319*** 3.1540*** 3.2218***
1st Stage Probit for Choice of provider by distance: CLOSEST vs NOT CLOSEST hospital – only PCI – Eq. (3)
Distance difference 2nd – 1st provider −0.0342*** −0.0419*** −0.0385*** −0.0408*** −0.0174*** −0.0224*** −0.0302*** −0.0422*** −0.0423***
EDI  income 1st quintile −0.3843*** −0.3981*** −0.3217*** −0.2464*** −0.1281*** −0.0521** −0.0282 −0.1350*** −0.1433***
EDI  income 2nd quintile −0.1111*** −0.1223*** −0.0101 −0.019 −0.022 0.0588** 0.0614** −0.0193 −0.0569***
EDI  income 3rd quintile −0.0792** −0.0775** −0.0409 −0.04 0.0102 0.0317 0.0642** 0.0313 0.0308
EDI  income 4th quintile −0.0871*** −0.0644** −0.0442 −0.003 −0.0008 −0.0036 0.1045*** 0.0278 0.027
Constant 0.2822*** 0.3393*** 0.2140*** 0.3757*** 0.0823** 0.1052*** 0.0909** 0.0974** 0.1691***
Patients 16095 20140 24355 25632 26772 25545 25399 23861 23759
Chi-squared p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pseudo R2 0.14 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.1 0.09
Notes. Roy model on PCI sample based on Model (2). Exclusion restriction in the 1st stage regression: differential distance between second closest and closest PCI hospital
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ospital ﬁxed effects (excuded in 1st stage probit choice). IMR = Parametric selectio
**  p < 0.01.
very year, the selection correction term is statistically signiﬁcant,
roviding evidence of self-selection. In both samples, the ﬁrst stage
robit suggests that less deprived patients are more mobile (either
ue to a stronger preference for shorter waits and higher quality,
r fewer constraints and difﬁculties with travelling) and therefore
nclined to bypass the closest hospital than more deprived patients.
 higher differential distance between providers (our exclusion
estriction) is associated with a lower probability of bypassing the
ocal hospital and it is always statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level
or both procedures.
Figs. 2 and 3 plot the conditional estimates (in days) from the Roy
odel allowing for bypassing the closest hospital. Until 2006, the
ocioeconomic gradient for patients bypassing their local hospital
s less pronounced than for those treated at their local hospital for
oth procedures. The most deprived CABG (PCI) patients admitted
o their local hospital waited around 44% (54%) longer in 2002 and
1% (15%) longer in 2010 compared to the least deprived patients.
nstead, the most deprived CABG (PCI) patients who bypassed their
ocal hospital waited 18% (50%) longer in 2002 and 7% (15%) longer
n 2010. From 2008 onwards the gradient tends to fade away in
ize and is not always statistically signiﬁcant for CABG patients,
hile it remains statistically signiﬁcant for PCI patients. Overall,
he second stage regressions conﬁrm the presence of signiﬁcant
both quantitatively and statistically) socioeconomic gradients in
aiting times for both patients bypassing and attending their local
ospital.
By design, the magnitude of the overall gradient in waiting
ime is a weighted average of the two estimated gradients of the
witching regression model, with weights equal to the proportionPlease cite this article in press as: Moscelli, G., et al., Socioeconomic ine
J. Health Econ. (2017), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2017.06.005
f patients bypassing the local hospital. We  utilise this property to
alculate the overall gradient after adjusting for selection and com-
are this to the gradient in Section 5.2 which does not adjust for
nd C and conﬁrm both the switching regimes hypothesis and the presence of a
ubstantial common support for the propensity score.ies, Gender, Number of diagnosis, Emergency Past utilization in the previous year,
ction (Inverse Mills Ratio). EDI = Economic Deprivation Index. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,
selection. Table 7 provides i) the expected waiting time for the most
(Q1) and least (Q5) deprived patient groups in a given year based
on the unadjusted pooled gradient (Columns B and C), ii) the gradi-
ent for patients bypassing (D and E) and not bypassing the closest
hospital (F and G), and iii) the overall adjusted gradient (H and I).
Columns L and M in Table 7 show how the adjusted overall
gradient differs from the unadjusted gradient, both in absolute
and relative terms. The results suggest that the unadjusted model
exhibits a larger socioeconomic waiting time gradient by up to 12%
for CABG patients and by up to 7% for PCI patients.
5.4. Switching regressions for choice of procedure
Table 8 shows the effect of income deprivation on waiting
times accounting for self-selection into revascularisation proce-
dure. The ﬁrst stage probit suggests that SES is not associated with
the choice of treatment alternative. However, the IMRs are statisti-
cally signiﬁcant at 5% level in ﬁve out of nine years. Accounting for
self-selection into treatment has negligible effects on the estimated
socioeconomic gradient. Because policy makers are usually con-
cerned with waiting times for individual cardiac revascularisation
procedures, we do not calculate an adjusted overall gradient.
The coefﬁcient of the exclusion restriction variable in the ﬁrst
stage regression is negative and statistically signiﬁcant at 1% level
in ﬁve of the nine years analysed. As expected, a larger differential
distance to CABG provider reduces the probability of choosing CABG
surgery.
The results are qualitatively similar (and available upon request
from the authors) when we  used waiting times as opposed to its
log transformation, though the SES gradient is less pronounced.
The appropriateness of employing the logarithmic transformationquality of access to healthcare: Does choice explain the gradient?
of waiting times versus the actual waits has been formally tested
with Akaike and Bayesian Information Criteria, Shapiro-Francia
normality test, Breusch-Pagan and Cameron-Trivedi heteroscedas-
ticity tests, and non-parametric graphical inspection methods (i.e.
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Fig. 2. Estimated CABG waiting times for patients choosing the closest hospital and bypassing the local hospital by deprivation quintile.
sest h
h
t
5
w
wFig. 3. Estimated PCI waiting times for patients choosing the clo
istograms of regression residuals). The results support the use of
he log transformation.
.5. Value of health forgone while waiting for treatmentPlease cite this article in press as: Moscelli, G., et al., Socioeconomic ine
J. Health Econ. (2017), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2017.06.005
Fig. 4 shows the individual monetary value of the health forgone
hile waiting for revascularisation by SES. This is based on Eq. (6)
ith Wˆgcomputed from the Roy model results (Eq. (4) and Eq. (5))ospital and bypassing the local hospital by deprivation quintile.
weighted by the proportion of patients bypassing the closest hos-
pital (i.e. the adjusted overall gradient). CABG patients forgo more
health while waiting than PCI patient because they wait longer
and because CABG surgery is more effective (larger health beneﬁt).quality of access to healthcare: Does choice explain the gradient?
Patients living in most deprived areas bear larger losses than those
in the average or least deprived LSOAs due to the unfavourable
waiting time gradient. The differences between the most and least
deprived patients are very large in the early years of the sample, and
ARTICLE IN PRESSG ModelJHE-2027; No. of Pages 25
G. Moscelli et al. / Journal of Health Economics xxx (2017) xxx–xxx 11
Table  7
Differences in the estimates of the overall waiting time gradient (in days) with and without adjusting for selection into hospitals.
Year Procedure Pooled –
unadjusted
Roy model –
bypassing closest
hospital
Roy model –
choosing closest
hospital
Pooled –
adjusted
Difference in
estimates between
unadjusted and
adjusted waiting
time gradient
A B C D E F G H I L M
% Bypassing
local hospital
Q1 Q5 Q1 Q5 Q1 Q5 Q1 Q5 Absolute Relative
2002 CABG 35.9% 188.9 140.7 143.1 121.1 177.6 123.1 165.2 122.4 −5.37 −11.0%
2003 CABG 40.4% 127.5 101 94 75.2 118.4 92 108.5 85.2 −3.17 −12.0%
2004 CABG 39.0% 109.2 92.3 87 69.3 95.4 82.4 92.1 77.3 −2.07 −12.1%
2005 CABG 34.9% 70.6 61.7 66.3 61.1 67.5 57 67.1 58.4 −0.25 −2.7%
2006 CABG 35.3% 73.7 62.6 72.5 62.8 70.5 59.1 71.2 60.4 −0.30 −2.7%
2007 CABG 36.0% 68.7 60.6 64.1 54.4 62.1 55.7 62.8 55.2 −0.51 −6.8%
2008 CABG 34.8% 60.7 56.6 50.5 49.7 59.3 53 56.2 51.9 0.29 5.6%
2009 CABG 33.0% 52.5 48.6 48.3 43.8 48.7 45.4 48.6 44.9 −0.20 −7.0%
2010 CABG 31.3% 53.9 49.1 53.1 49.7 52.5 47.4 52.7 48.1 −0.23 −3.8%
2002 PCI 35.4% 114.2 74.8 112.8 75.3 115.4 74.7 114.5 74.9 0.17 0.3%
2003 PCI 36.7% 111.8 81.5 101 76 109 79 106.1 77.9 −2.13 −7.1%
2004 PCI 34.3% 96 76.2 91.8 76.3 92.3 72 92.1 73.5 −1.15 −5.4%
2005 PCI 40.4% 61.5 52.2 58.6 50.5 60.1 50.5 59.5 50.5 −0.31 −3.1%
2006 PCI 44.0% 56.9 48.1 57.8 50.1 54.5 45.3 56.0 47.4 −0.26 −3.9%
2007 PCI 41.7% 48.7 41.2 47.8 38.7 45.8 39.9 46.6 39.4 −0.27 −3.5%
2008 PCI 40.6% 39.1 35 38.8 34.2 37.2 33.6 37.8 33.8 −0.09 −1.8%
2009 PCI 35.6% 41.6 36.8 38 32.7 39.1 35.1 38.7 34.2 −0.34 −6.0%
2010 PCI 36.3% 42.1 36.6 39.9 34.6 40.4 35.2 40.2 35.0 −0.26 −3.7%
Notes. Q1 (Q5) = patients living in most (least) income-deprived English LSOAs. A = Percentage of patients bypassing the closest hospital. B, C = baseline OLS estimates of
average waiting time for most (Q1)/least (Q5) income-deprived patients (Eq. (1)). D, E = Roy model estimates of average waiting time for most/least income-deprived
patients bypassing the closest hospital (Eq. (4)).F, G = Roy model estimates of average waiting time for most/least income-deprived patients choosing the closest hospital
(Eq.  (5)). H = A*D + (1-A)*F = estimates of average waiting time for most income-deprived patients, after correction for self-selection. I = A*E + (1-A)*G = estimates of average
waiting  time for least income-deprived patients, after correction for self-selection. L = (H-I)-(B-C) = absolute difference in the SES waiting time gradient due to selection.
M  = [(H-I)-(B-C)]/(B-C) = percentage difference in the SES waiting time gradient due to selection.
Table 8
Roy model. Income inequalities in waiting times on CABG and PCI samples, after accounting for selection of revascularisation procedure.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Patients choosing CABG – Eq. (4)
EDI income 1st quintile 0.3605*** 0.2238*** 0.1614*** 0.1319*** 0.1544*** 0.1260*** 0.0695*** 0.0783*** 0.0927***
EDI  income 2nd quintile 0.2557*** 0.1711*** 0.1028*** 0.1107*** 0.1425*** 0.1623*** 0.0708*** 0.0809*** 0.0925***
EDI  income 3rd quintile 0.1868*** 0.0894*** 0.1423*** 0.0959*** 0.0878*** 0.0724*** 0.0481* 0.0267 0.0679**
EDI  income 4th quintile 0.0450 0.0685** 0.0602** 0.0578** 0.0336 0.0947*** 0.0225 0.0080 0.0300
IMR1  − CABG −0.5930** 0.7736** 0.5971** 0.1162 0.3761 −0.0025 −0.2828 0.1087 0.1413
Constant 3.9205*** 4.7000*** 4.2609*** 3.8637*** 4.2500*** 3.9414*** 3.0829*** 3.2087*** 3.3728***
Patients choosing PCI – Eq. (5)
EDI income 1st quintile 0.5063*** 0.3105*** 0.2323*** 0.1661*** 0.1688*** 0.1670*** 0.1093*** 0.1189*** 0.1364***
EDI  income 2nd quintile 0.3974*** 0.2556*** 0.1977*** 0.1622*** 0.1638*** 0.1193*** 0.0988*** 0.1215*** 0.1214***
EDI  income 3rd quintile 0.2819*** 0.1568*** 0.1083*** 0.1189*** 0.1171*** 0.0903*** 0.0985*** 0.0898*** 0.0906***
EDI  income 4th quintile 0.1365*** 0.0998*** 0.0469** 0.0406** 0.0667*** 0.0672*** 0.0486*** 0.0547*** 0.0541***
IMR0  − PCI −0.7795* 0.5696 −0.1959 −0.1536 0.0035 0.1766 −0.2522 −0.5481*** −0.4976***
Constant 4.2005*** 3.5923*** 4.1968*** 3.6976*** 3.5055*** 3.0236*** 3.5466*** 3.4960*** 3.4379***
1st Stage Probit for Choice of procedure: CABG vs PCI – Eq. (3)
Differential distance of ﬁrst 3
hospitals by procedure
−0.0016*** 0.0001 −0.0013*** −0.0008** −0.0004 0.0009*** −0.0003 −0.0008** −0.0020***
EDI  income 1st quintile 0.1810*** 0.0191 0.0173 0.0338 0.0295 −0.0008 −0.0030 −0.0087 −0.0053
EDI  income 2nd quintile 0.1254*** 0.0314 −0.0024 0.0543** 0.0077 0.0148 0.0281 0.0139 0.0104
EDI  income 3rd quintile 0.0909*** 0.0016 −0.0176 0.0314 −0.0171 0.0252 −0.0014 0.0039 −0.0300
EDI  income 4th quintile 0.0636*** −0.0210 −0.0177 0.0612*** 0.0017 −0.0050 −0.0284 0.0013 0.0282
Constant −0.0714** −0.1671*** −0.3132*** −0.4841*** −0.4246*** −0.2987*** −0.3746*** −0.4634*** −0.5697***
Patients 30749 34353 38429 37692 38308 37763 37228 33861 32647
Chi-squared p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.13
Notes. Roy model on joint CABG and PCI samples. Exclusion restriction in the 1st stage regression: (average) distance between the three closest hospitals providing CABG and
t sion m
P e). IMR
I
a
T
lhe  three closest hospitals providing PCI. Controls: Age, age bands dummies, admis
ast  utilization previous year, hospital ﬁxed effects (except for 1st stage probit choic
ndex. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.Please cite this article in press as: Moscelli, G., et al., Socioeconomic ine
J. Health Econ. (2017), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2017.06.005
mount to approximately £850 for CABG and £715 for PCI in 2002.
hese socioeconomic inequality gaps reduce sharply over time in
ine with the waiting time gradient, but do not disappear. In 2010,onth, Charlson comorbidities dummies, Gender, Number of diagnosis, Emergency
 = Parametric selection correction (Inverse Mills Ratio). EDI = Economic Deprivationquality of access to healthcare: Does choice explain the gradient?
the waiting time gap between most and least deprived patients is
worth approximately £90 for both CABG and PCI patients. Compar-
ing this to a hypothetical scenario in which waiting times across all
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atients are equal to the national average17 the total re-distributing
ffect of waiting time inequalities is about £295,000 for CABG
atients and £750,000 for PCI patients in 2010 alone.
. Robustness checks
.1. Hospital characteristics and choice of bypassing the closest
ospital
The choice of bypassing the closest hospital may  be a func-
ion not only of the distance to providers, but also their quality
nd waiting times. A recent study by Gaynor et al. (2016) shows
hat CABG patients in England are more likely to choose hospitals
ith higher quality, as measured by lower risk-adjusted mortality,
hen patient choice policies were enhanced, but are not sensitive
o variations in waiting times.
We investigate whether the SES gradient in waiting times shown
n Table 7 (based on the selection equations of bypassing the local
ospital in Tables 5 and 6) is robust to the inclusion of quality and
aiting times in the selection equations. To avoid simultaneity bias
etween volume and quality (e.g. due to learning-by-doing or con-
estion effects), we include quality and waiting times lagged by
ne year, which is also consistent with a demand speciﬁcation withPlease cite this article in press as: Moscelli, G., et al., Socioeconomic ine
J. Health Econ. (2017), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2017.06.005
daptive expectations.18
The quality and wait indicators are computed, similarly to the
istance variables, as differences to the closest provider. For each
17 In a capacity constrained health system, reductions in waiting times for the more
eprived are likely to be achieved through increases for the less deprived.
18 The use of lagged hospitals characteristics is in line with previous studies on
ospital choice (Beukers et al., 2014; Gutacker et al., 2016b; Moscelli et al., 2016).e waiting (by procedure and deprivation quintile).
revascularization procedure (CABG, PCI), the differential quality
and waiting times variables are computed respectively as 
q =
q5 − q1 and 
w = w5 − w1, where q1 and w1 are hospital qual-
ity and waiting times in the closest (hospital) Trust, lagged by one
year, and q5 and w5 are the average quality and waiting times in
the ﬁve second closest Trusts, lagged by one year.
As a proxy of quality we  use standardised mortality rates com-
puted according to the Dr Foster Intelligence methodology.19 As
a proxy of wait we compute the proportion of patients waiting
in excess of the 3rd quartile (e.g. 75%) of the procedure-speciﬁc
wait distributions. The latter is in line with evidence suggesting
that patients dislike long waiting times (Gutacker et al., 2016a;
Moscelli et al., 2016). As an additional indicator of hospital quality,
we include a dummy  variable when the closest hospital is predom-
inantly a specialist cardiothoracic hospital: patients should be less
likely to bypass the closest hospital if it is a specialist one.
The use of lagged variables reduces the sample in the presence
of hospital entry since we  cannot include lagged quality and wait-
ing times for hospitals entering the market in a given year.20 We
therefore also estimate the Roy models based on the restricted sam-
ple with the selection equations including distance but excluding
quality and waiting times (as in the main model in Section 5) to
isolate the effect of the latter variables from changes to the sample.quality of access to healthcare: Does choice explain the gradient?
The key results are reported in Table 9. Columns A, B and C report
respectively the proportionate difference in waiting times between
the lowest and highest SES group when the selection equation
19 See http://www.drfoster.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/HSMR Toolkit
Version 9 July 2014.pdf
20 During the period 2002–2010, the number of hospital sites offering PCI almost
tripled but stayed approximately constant for CABG.
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Table  9
Comparison of SES gradient controlling for selection due to patients bypassing the closest hospital.
A B C D E
Year Sample % bypassing
closest hospital
Smaller sample
due to hospital
entry
% bypassing
closest hospital;
Smaller sample
SES gradient SES gradient 95% Conﬁdence
Intervals
SES gradient 95% Conﬁdence
Intervals
CABG
2002 14,661 35.9% 14,654 35.9% 34.9% 34.5% [23.1%; 46.0%] 34.9% [23.4%; 46.4%]
2003  14,219 40.4% 13,678 38.4% 27.2% 27.6% [17.1%; 38.2%] 27.6% [17.1%; 38.1%]
2004  14,074 39.0% 14,074 39.0% 19.6% 19.6% [10.5%; 28.8%] 19.6% [10.5%; 28.7%]
2005 12,060 34.9% 12,060 34.9% 14.9% 14.9% [6.8%; 23.0%] 14.9% [6.9%; 23.0%]
2006  11,536 35.3% 11,536 35.3% 17.9% 17.9% [9.6%; 26.2%] 17.9% [9.6%; 26.2%]
2007  12,218 36.0% 11,245 32.3% 13.8% 13.5% [5.6%; 21.5%] 13.4% [5.5%; 21.3%]
2008  11,831 34.8% 11,635 33.9% 8.2% 8.3% [0.8%; 15.8%] 8.4% [0.9%; 15.9%]
2009  10,000 33.0% 10,000 33.0% 8.2% 8.1% [−0.2%; 16.3%] 8.2% [−0.1%; 16.4%]
2010  8888 31.3% 8888 31.3% 9.5% 9.5% [0.6%; 18.4%] 9.5% [0.6%; 18.4%]
PCI
2002 16,099 35.4% 15,600 33.5% 52.8% 53.4% [41.1%; 65.7%] 53.4% [41.1%; 65.7%]
2003  20,144 36.7% 18,413 32.4% 36.1% 35.6% [26.1%; 45.0%] 35.5% [26.1%; 45.0%]
2004  24,358 34.3% 23,668 33.5% 25.6% 26.5% [19.7%; 33.3%] 26.4% [19.6%; 33.2%]
2005  25,632 40.4% 20,524 29.4% 17.8% 19.3% [13.3%; 25.3%] 19.5% [13.5%; 25.5%]
2006  26,775 44.0% 23,470 39.3% 18.0% 18.0% [12.5%; 23.6%] 18.0% [12.5%; 23.6%]
2007  25,553 41.7% 21,814 36.2% 18.4% 17.4% [11.6%; 23.3%] 17.4% [11.5%; 23.2%]
2008  25,404 40.6% 22,767 36.6% 11.8% 11.8% [6.6%; 17.0%] 11.8% [6.6%; 17.0%]
2009  23,862 35.6% 22,609 34.0% 13.2% 12.8% [7.5%; 18.2%] 12.8% [7.5%; 18.2%]
2010  23,762 36.3% 22,196 33.3% 14.9% 14.3% [9.0%; 19.7%] 14.2% [8.9%; 19.6%]
Controls included in the selection equation
Differential distances YES YES YES YES YES
Hospital quality and waiting times NO YES YES NO NO
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motes. A = 100*[(column H of Table 7/column I of Table 7) − 1]; B = same as A, but us
ospital quality and waiting times; C = 95% conﬁdence interval around B; D = same
aiting times; E = 95% conﬁdence interval around D.
ncludes: i) distance only; ii) distance, quality and waiting times
n the restricted sample, and iii) distance only on the restricted
ample. The gradients are very similar under the three speciﬁca-
ions, and we therefore conclude that our results are robust to the
nclusion of quality and waiting times in the selection equations.
The selection equations are shown in Tables F1 and F2 in the
ppendix. For CABG, Table F1 shows that after the introduction of
atient choice in 2006 patients are more likely to choose hospitals
ith lower mortality. This is not the case before the choice policies,
ikely reﬂecting the restricted choice that patients faced before such
eforms. Patients are more likely to bypass the local hospital when
aiting times are long throughout the period considered, except
or the last two years when waiting times were very short and may
ct as residual category of reputation (hospitals with high demand
ave longer waits). The results are plausible and in line with Gaynor
t al. (2016) which show that CABG patients choose hospitals by
ower mortality when patient choice policies were enhanced.21
.2. Patient severity, SES and choice of revascularization
rocedurePlease cite this article in press as: Moscelli, G., et al., Socioeconomic ine
J. Health Econ. (2017), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2017.06.005
A possible concern is that the choice between CABG and PCI is
imited only to the most severe patients, especially in last period of
21 For PCI, Table F2 shows that after 2006 patients were less likely to bypass their
losest hospital if it was a specialist cardiothoracic centre. They are also more likely
o  bypass their closest hospital when waiting times are long in the ﬁrst three years
ut this is not so in the later years when the coefﬁcients are positive and again
his could be due to the shorter waiting times acting as a proxy of reputation. The
oefﬁcients on mortality go from positive in the ﬁrst three years to negative in the
ollowing two years, which is to some extent in line with CABG results, but are
ositive in the last four years. The counter-intuitive results for the latter could be
ue  to the smaller variation of mortality in PCI (since the risk of mortality is low, i.e.
.36% in our sample), the limitation imposed by the reduced-form modelling using
 probit model instead of more complex discrete choice model,  and the fact that the
pecialisation dummy  discussed above may  act as a better quality indicator than
ortality.timates and samples from Tables F1 and F2, with selection accounting for distance,
, but estimated on samples as in Tables F1 and F2, excluding hospital quality and
our sample when PCI seems to increasingly substitute for CABG. If
the most severe patients also come from the most deprived areas,
then the estimates of the selection equation might be biased. To
ascertain whether this is the case, we  estimate also a Roy Model
with choice between CABG and PCI, whose selection equation
allows for interaction terms between the SES indicators and: i)
the number of past emergency admissions; and ii) the number of
co-morbidities.
The results are reported in Table 10, which compares the SES
gradient in waiting times with (column B) and without (column
A) the interactions. The results are very similar. For completeness,
the coefﬁcients of the Roy Model are shown in Appendix Table
G1 and are in line with Table 8: patients become more likely to
choose CABG over PCI as the number of co-morbidities increases
and the number of past emergency admissions decreases,22 but the
interactions terms with the SES are mostly insigniﬁcant.
6.3. Patient costs, SES and choice of revascularization procedure
The choice between CABG and PCI could be a function of the
expected recovery time and costs. CABG surgery requires consid-
erably more recovery time than PCI, with an in-hospital Length of
Stay (LoS) of 7–10 days, and a full expected recovery after 12 weeks,
compared to a 1–2 days in-hospital LoS and a week recovery period
for PCI. These differences in LoS and recovery time might affect
differently the choice of individuals with different SES.
To allow for this, we estimate a Roy Model where the selec-
tion equation between CABG and PCI allows for differences inquality of access to healthcare: Does choice explain the gradient?
LoS between the two procedures. More precisely, we compute
the difference in the average LoS between the two procedures,

LoS = LoSCABG − LoSPCI , where LoSCABG and LoSPCI are averaged
22 The same pattern arises in Table 8, whose full estimation results of the selection
equation are reported in the Appendix, Table G3, Panel C.
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Table 10
Comparison of SES gradient controlling for selection due to choice of procedure.
A B C D E
Year SES gradient 95% conﬁdence interval SES gradient 95% conﬁdence interval
CABG
2002 41.4% 36.5% [27.1%; 45.9%] 36.4% [27.0%; 45.7%]
2003  25.1% 25.7% [18.5%; 32.9%] 25.7% [18.5%; 32.9%]
2004  17.4% 17.4% [11.1%; 23.7%] 17.7% [11.4%; 24.0%]
2005  14.1% 14.3% [8.5%; 20.1%] 14.5% [8.7%; 20.3%]
2006  16.8% 17.4% [11.5%; 23.2%] 17.0% [11.2%; 22.9%]
2007  13.4% 13.4% [8.0%; 18.9%] 13.4% [8.0%; 18.8%]
2008  7.2% 7.2% [2.0%; 12.5%] 7.1% [1.8%; 12.4%]
2009  8.1% 8.1% [2.2%; 13.9%] 8.1% [2.2%; 14.0%]
2010  9.6% 9.6% [3.1%; 16.0%] 9.6% [3.2%; 16.0%]
PCI
2002  61.2% 56.2% [46.2%; 66.2%] 56.4% [46.5%; 66.4%]
2003  36.5% 36.8% [30.2%; 43.3%] 36.9% [30.4%; 43.4%]
2004  26.1% 25.6% [20.9%; 30.4%] 25.9% [21.2%; 30.7%]
2005  18.0% 18.0% [14.3%; 21.7%] 18.0% [14.2%; 21.7%]
2006  18.4% 18.2% [14.4%; 22.0%] 18.2% [14.4%; 22.0%]
2007  18.2% 18.2% [14.4%; 22.0%] 18.2% [14.3%; 22.0%]
2008  11.5% 11.6% [8.1%; 15.0%] 11.6% [8.1%; 15.1%]
2009  12.8% 12.8% [9.1%; 16.5%] 12.8% [9.1%; 16.5%]
2010  14.8% 14.8% [11.0%; 18.5%] 14.8% [11.0%; 18.5%]
Controls included in the selection equation
Difference in distances to the closest CABG and PCI hospitals YES YES YES YES YES
SES  * past emergency admissions NO YES YES NO NO
SES  * comorbidities NO YES YES NO NO
LoS,  SES * LoS NO NO NO YES YES
Notes. Column A results are from models reported in Table 8. Column B results from models in Table 8, adding interactions terms of SES indicator variables with number
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oS  (Length of Stay) in the ﬁve closest hospitals and the interactions terms of SES 
ootnote  9 for formal deﬁnition of “Difference in distances to the closest CABG and 
cross the ﬁve closest hospitals. LoS represents a proxy of dif-
erential expected ‘recovery costs’, which may  affect the choice of
ABG vs. PCI.23 The selection equation of the Roy Model includes i)
LoS and ii) the interactions between LoS and SES.
The SES gradient in waiting times based on this Roy model is
eported in column D of Table 10. The gradient is very similar to
ur baseline one (in column A). The results are therefore robust
o this extension. (Full results of the Roy model are reported in
he Appendix, Table G2 and are in line with Table 8). The selection
quation suggests that patients prefer CABG over PCI the shorter is
he average LoS for CABG compared to PCI. The effect of LoS and
ts interaction terms with SES are mostly insigniﬁcant, except for
he most deprived patients in 2007 and 2008.
. Conclusions
Several studies suggest that publicly-funded health systems are
rone to pro-rich inequalities in hospital waiting times for elec-
ive procedures (Siciliani, 2016), even in countries like England
nd Norway with well-funded and mature systems of universal
ealth coverage. This study improves our understanding of such
nequalities and provides four key results and policy insights.
First, waiting time inequalities by socioeconomic status within
ospitals tend to be larger in relative terms for complex tertiary
nterventions for life threatening conditions like coronary heartPlease cite this article in press as: Moscelli, G., et al., Socioeconomic ine
J. Health Econ. (2017), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2017.06.005
isease than for conditions which are not life threatening such
s osteoarthritis, which is frequently treated by hip replacement
urgery. We  ﬁnd that patients living in the most deprived ﬁfths of
mall areas wait 35% longer compared to the least deprived ﬁfths
23 We do not have information regarding out-of-hospital recovery costs for the
wo  procedures. We  assume that the out-of-hospital recovery costs are positively
orrelated to the in-hospital length of stay.the Roy Model. Column D results from models in Table 8, adding both the average
tor variables with the average LoS in the selection equation of the Roy Model. See
spitals”.
for CABG and 53% longer for PCI in 2002, falling to 9.5% and 15%
respectively in 2011. These differences are economically mean-
ingful: the health that more deprived CABG patients forgo due
to waiting longer than less deprived patients was  worth approx-
imately £850 per person in 2002/03, reducing to £90 in 2010/11.
In contrast, Laudicella et al. (2012) estimate a 7.7% gap in wait-
ing time within hospitals between the most and least deprived
groups of patients who underwent hip replacement surgery in Eng-
land in 2001 (see also Cooper et al., 2009; showing smaller gaps
for cataract surgery and knee replacement within and across hos-
pitals). This indicates that socioeconomic inequalities in waiting
times may  be exacerbated when patients seek care for potentially
life-threatening diseases.
Second, waiting time inequalities are not primarily due to choice
of hospital or type of treatment for the life-threating condition
which we investigate. Only up to 12% of the overall waiting time
gradient is due to choice, and this effect did not increase after 2006
when the English NHS choice reforms were introduced. Moreover,
the substantial fall in pro-rich inequality began in 2002 when aver-
age waiting times started to fall (Propper et al., 2010) but had largely
ﬁnished by 2006 when the choice policy was  introduced (Cookson
et al., 2012a).
The study by Gaynor et al. (2016) shows that choice of hospital
for patients in need of CABG responded to quality (in particu-
lar the more severe and low income patients) but not to waiting
times when the choice policies were introduced in 2006 (with high
income patients having at most a higher, rather than lower, willing-
ness to travel for long waiting times; p. 3545). Therefore, patients
with higher socioeconomic status (or higher severity) did not bene-
ﬁt from reduced waiting times by being able to exercise choice and
travelling further. This further conﬁrms that the enhancement ofquality of access to healthcare: Does choice explain the gradient?
patient choice did not contribute to the reduction in waiting time
inequalities, and this may  be due to the willingness or ability to
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ravel being driven mostly by quality considerations as opposed to
aiting times ones for a serious cardiovascular condition.
The role of choice may  be different for less serious and more
tandardised procedures such as cataract and hip replacements,
hough demand elasticities to waiting times remain low and around
.1 (Sivey, 2012; Gutacker et al., 2016a; Gutacker et al., 2016b;
oscelli et al., 2016). Future work could adopt our framework to
uantify the role of choice in explaining wait inequalities for these
onditions, though we conjecture the role of choice will remain
imited due to low demand elasticities to waiting times. There is an
xtensive literature which tests if quality affects patients’ choices
n the US (Gaynor and Town, 2011), but waiting times are low in the
S (Schoen et al., 2010) and therefore unlikely to affect choice. Our
tudy has implications mostly for those publicly-funded systems
either NHS or social insurance ones) where i) waiting times remain
ong due to restrained public budgets and excess demand, and ii)
atient choice policies are increasingly encouraged and supported
y public reporting of quality indicators (Siciliani et al., 2017).
Third, we show that waiting time inequalities tend to be larger
n both absolute and relative terms when average waiting times
re high. Inequalities reduced when the average waiting time fell.
his suggests that the level of pro-rich inequality in waiting time
epends more on the overall duration of the wait than on the extent
f patient choice. As discussed in Section 2, the reduction in average
aiting times were obtained by a mix  of sustained and unusually
igh public health care expenditure growth in England during the
000s and an aggressive maximum waiting time target regime, and
his fall was not associated with choice reform from 2006. Our ﬁnd-
ngs suggests that policies which reduce average waiting times also
educe inequalities in waiting times. This is consistent with other
tudies of the pattern of reduced inequality in the English NHS
uring the 2000s in the utilization of health care (Cookson et al.,
012b, 2013). Waiting times have recently stagnated or started to
ise again due to adverse ﬁnancial climate and general reduction
n public spending. Therefore, our analysis suggests that countries
hich experience increases in waiting times will also experience
ncrease in inequalities in waiting times.
Fourth, we have shown that substantial socioeconomic inequal-
ties occur within the same hospital in the English health system,Please cite this article in press as: Moscelli, G., et al., Socioeconomic ine
J. Health Econ. (2017), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2017.06.005
or patients waiting for effective treatment for a serious heart con-
ition. Since these inequalities are not primarily due to differences
n patient choice of hospital or procedure, several other mecha-
isms may  explain the presence of a gradient in waiting times PRESS
conomics xxx (2017) xxx–xxx 15
after controlling for selection due to patients’ choices. One plau-
sible mechanism is what one might call elbowing behaviour by less
deprived patients. More socioeconomically advantaged patients
are likely to be better endowed with information, networking
skills, contacts and consciousness of their rights, enabling them to
exercise more effective pressure to get prioritised for treatment.
Moreover, the practice of defensive medicine by medical staff and
hospital management may  imply that richer patients are riskier to
disappoint if the health of the patient deteriorates while waiting,
and they (or their families) are more likely to take legal recourse
for medical malpractice since they can afford the legal expenses
for the losing party in a medical malpractice litigation in England
(Miller, 1985).24 Finally, the phenomenon of unconscious bias can
occur if doctors are better able to understand and interpret the
health symptoms of patients who are more similar to them in terms
of socioeconomic status.
Future research could explore in greater detail which of these
mechanisms is at work to guide policy developments.25 Since pol-
icy makers in Europe and other OECD countries have explicit policy
goals to ensure equality of access based on need, waiting time
inequalities are cause for concern and need to be addressed. If it
is the poor who  fall behind because they are more likely to miss
appointments and maintain contact with the hospital, policies that
facilitate access and communication may  be appropriate. If it is
instead the rich who  jump ahead of the queue, a more robust man-
agement of the waiting list is required.26
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24 “[.][S]ince British litigants who do not qualify for publicly funded legal services
must pay for the assistance of counsel themselves, ﬁnancial considerations can be
a  substantial deterrent to the pursuit of legal remedies. In addition, a losing party
in  a lawsuit usually must reimburse the prevailing party’s litigation expenses.’ In
deciding whether or not to ﬁle suit, a potential plaintiff must therefore consider not
only his own legal expenses, but also his opponents’ expenses” (Miller, 1985).
25 Sinko et al. (2015) study waiting time distributions and ﬁnd that waiting times
for  less severe patients have been reducing over-proportionally after the intro-
duction of the maximum waiting time policy in the English NHS  across different
specialties. This may be interpreted as a move towards a ’ﬁrst-come-ﬁrst-serve’ pri-
oritisation rule, and is consistent with the increased equity in waiting times that we
have observed towards the end of our study period. Gutacker et al. (2016b) analyse
detailed data on patients’ self-reported pre-operative health and still ﬁnd evidence
for severity-based prioritisation in elective hip and knee replacement surgery.
26 These policies focus on socioeconomic inequalities which arise within the hospi-
tal, which is the focus of our analysis. This is justiﬁed since there are little inequalities
in  waiting times across hospitals in England for the treatments considered. Inequal-
ities across hospitals can be important in some health systems such as Australia
(Johar et al., 2013) and could be potentially be addressed by a better allocation of
resources. Our study shows that socioeconomic inequality in waiting time within
hospitals can occur also in universal health systems where allocation of resources
between hospitals follows a need based allocation formula.
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Appendix A.
Table A1
Observed waiting times, patients bypassing the closest hospital and distances to closest hospital, by year and income deprivation quintiles
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
(a) CABG observed
waiting times.
EDI Income 1st quint. (Most Deprived) 171.3 111.3 101.1 67.7 68.0 64.5 55.4 47.1 46.5
EDI  Income 2nd quint. 157.9 109.7 98.5 65.3 67.7 66.6 58.2 51.2 51.1
EDI  Income 3rd quint. 156.3 107.1 101.7 68.9 66.3 62.6 59.6 50.9 52.9
EDI  Income 4th quint. 144.5 104.7 97.6 64.0 64.6 66.4 57.7 48.9 50.5
EDI  Income 5th quint. (Least Deprived) 134.2 97.5 92.4 60.7 63.2 62.1 58.0 49.5 50.6
(b)  PCI observed
waiting times.
EDI Income 1st quint. (Most Deprived) 102.3 101.4 89.8 58.6 54.3 45.3 37.2 39.4 40.1
EDI  Income 2nd quint. 96.9 99.3 87.7 58.7 53.5 44.5 37.3 41.8 39.7
EDI  Income 3rd quint. 90.6 94.7 83.6 57.5 53.2 44.9 39.0 40.6 39.7
EDI  Income 4th quint. 81.7 88.4 80.2 54.4 52.9 44.3 37.0 40.3 39.0
EDI  Income 5th quint. (Least Deprived) 78.7 81.2 77.2 53.3 48.9 42.5 36.2 38.1 37.9
(c)  % CABG bypassing
closest hospital.
EDI Income 1st quint. (Most Deprived) 31.8% 35.7% 35.3% 29.2% 28.9% 32.5% 30.0% 30.1% 29.4%
EDI  Income 2nd quint. 38.3% 41.8% 41.0% 36.2% 39.8% 36.8% 37.0% 33.2% 32.7%
EDI  Income 3rd quint. 36.0% 39.6% 38.7% 34.9% 34.3% 35.9% 32.6% 33.9% 31.2%
EDI  Income 4th quint. 35.1% 40.9% 38.1% 35.6% 34.5% 35.7% 36.9% 33.7% 32.3%
EDI  Income 5th quint. (Least Deprived) 38.8% 43.8% 41.6% 38.4% 39.2% 39.2% 37.4% 34.1% 30.6%
(d)  % PCI bypassing
closest hospital.
EDI Income 1st quint. (Most Deprived) 27.9% 29.2% 27.8% 35.5% 40.8% 40.7% 40.5% 33.5% 34.3%
EDI  Income 2nd quint. 37.5% 39.0% 37.8% 42.9% 45.0% 44.2% 41.6% 37.0% 36.2%
EDI  Income 3rd quint. 36.1% 37.0% 34.2% 39.0% 43.9% 40.8% 39.9% 35.7% 36.7%
EDI  Income 4th quint. 35.5% 37.1% 34.4% 41.0% 44.1% 40.4% 41.6% 35.2% 36.4%
EDI  Income 5th quint. (Least Deprived) 39.5% 41.0% 37.3% 43.7% 46.2% 42.7% 39.4% 36.7% 37.3%
(e)  distance to closest
CABG hospital.
EDI Income 1st quint. (Most Deprived) 17.6 17.2 16.9 18.5 18.4 17.6 17.8 18.3 17.7
EDI  Income 2nd quint. 23.7 24.8 25.7 26.0 26.2 24.3 23.8 23.2 23.3
EDI  Income 3rd quint. 28.3 27.8 30.1 30.4 32.1 29.0 28.3 29.8 27.9
EDI  Income 4th quint. 28.8 29.8 29.8 30.8 31.4 29.6 28.5 29.8 28.1
EDI  Income 5th quint. (Least Deprived) 26.4 26.3 26.3 27.2 27.9 25.2 26.1 26.6 26.0
(f)  distance to closest
PCI hospital.
EDI Income 1st quint. (Most Deprived) 15.3 14.9 14.7 12.9 12.0 11.3 10.7 10.6 9.7
EDI  Income 2nd quint. 22.2 21.7 20.8 18.4 15.7 14.9 13.6 13.6 12.9
EDI  Income 3rd quint. 24.9 26.2 25.2 23.1 18.4 18.1 16.1 15.3 14.8
EDI  Income 4th quint. 27.0 27.2 26.9 23.3 19.6 18.1 16.6 16.5 15.9
EDI  Income 5th quint. (Least Deprived) 23.0 22.8 23.5 21.2 18.8 17.3 15.7 16.1 15.2
(g)   distance (2nd –
1st) closest CABG hosp.
EDI Income 1st quint. (Most Deprived) 20.2 17.9 18.1 19.6 20.4 21.1 22.4 21.4 21.2
EDI  Income 2nd quint. 20.6 18.4 20.2 20.3 20.9 22.5 23.2 23.6 23.5
EDI  Income 3rd quint. 23.5 21.5 23.5 25.4 25.4 26.1 26.7 25.6 26.1
EDI  Income 4th quint. 23.2 21.3 22.8 22.2 24.4 24.4 24.8 25.4 25.5
EDI  Income 5th quint. (Least Deprived) 19.4 17.3 19.7 20.5 20.5 22.4 21.2 23.1 25.1
(h)   distance (2nd –
1st) closest PCI
EDI Income 1st quint. (Most Deprived) 18.7 18.3 17.7 16.6 15.5 14.7 11.4 12.9 11.3
EDI  Income 2nd quint. 17.0 16.8 17.0 16.3 15.0 15.1 13.3 13.3 12.4
1
1
1
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Chospital. EDI  Income 3rd quint. 19.7 
EDI  Income 4th quint. 20.0 
EDI  Income 5th quint. (Least Deprived) 19.0 
ppendix B.
how F-test for switching regimesPlease cite this article in press as: Moscelli, G., et al., Socioeconomic ine
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In each year, the Chow F-test rejects the hypothesis of the con-
itional waiting times for the two revascularisation procedures
oming from the same data generating process at 99% conﬁdence
able B1
how F-test for switching regimes.
CHOW test on Procedures (a)
Years 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Chow F-stat value 34.557 19.704 14.357 14.584 
F-stat  90% C.L. 1.216 1.205 1.205 1.198 
F-stat  95% C.L. 1.285 1.270 1.270 1.261 
F-stat  99% C.L. 1.422 1.399 1.399 1.384 
CHOW test on Closest Hospital Bypassing – CABG sample (b)
Years 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Chow F-stat value 3.432 2.339 2.326 1.278 
F-stat  90% C.L. 1.228 1.223 1.224 1.228 
F-stat  95% C.L. 1.301 1.294 1.297 1.301 
F-stat  99% C.L. 1.447 1.436 1.440 1.447 9.5 19.7 18.8 18.4 18.2 15.5 15.6 14.7
9.9 19.6 18.2 17.3 16.9 14.7 15.9 14.4
8.5 18.4 16.3 14.4 14.1 12.5 13.0 11.6
level. The test also rejects the hypothesis of conditional waiting
times for each procedure coming from the exact same process for
people treated or not at their closest hospital site, at 99% conﬁdencequality of access to healthcare: Does choice explain the gradient?
level for PCI and at least 95% conﬁdence level for CABG (excluding
the last year of the sample). These results support the use of switch-
ing regression models as the correct empirical speciﬁcation for our
analysis.
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
16.588 27.703 27.063 12.416 11.108
1.189 1.183 1.176 1.174 1.170
1.249 1.240 1.231 1.229 1.223
1.367 1.353 1.339 1.336 1.327
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
1.756 1.668 1.466 1.385 1.197
1.228 1.226 1.224 1.228 1.228
1.301 1.299 1.297 1.302 1.302
1.447 1.444 1.440 1.448 1.448
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Table  B1 (Continued)
CHOW test on Closest Hospital Bypassing – PCI sample (c)
Years 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Chow F-stat value 3.237 3.776 2.754 3.252 2.403 3.115 2.457 2.545 1.703
99 
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oF-stat 90% C.L. 1.219 1.212 1.209 1.1
F-stat 95% C.L. 1.290 1.280 1.276 1.2
F-stat 99% C.L. 1.430 1.414 1.408 1.3
ppendix C.
ropensity score by self-selection status.
In Fig. C1 we plot a graphical representation of the estimated
arametric propensity score computed in ﬁnancial years 2002/03
nd 2010/11, based on the observable covariates included in the
odel. The top two graphs in Fig. C1 show the propensity score
requency in the CABG sample based on the estimates of Eq. (3),
he middle ones show the propensity score frequency in the PCI
ample based on the estimates of Eq. (3) and the bottom ones the
ropensity score frequency in the pooled CABG and PCI patients’
ample based on the estimates of Eq. (3).
The plots show the validity of the common support assumptionPlease cite this article in press as: Moscelli, G., et al., Socioeconomic ine
J. Health Econ. (2017), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2017.06.005
n our models. If patients in the different selection regimes were
o different to the point of not being comparable, then the plots in
ig. C1 would show a complete lack of overlap of the frequencies
f the estimated propensity score by bandwidth (vertical axis). The
Fig. C1. Propensity score by1.190 1.185 1.178 1.176 1.171
1.251 1.243 1.235 1.231 1.224
1.369 1.357 1.345 1.340 1.329
overlap of the distributions instead is evident. The speciﬁcation of
the ﬁrst stage probit seems to be capturing adequately the com-
mon  underlying risk factors behind the self-selection choices and
the estimated propensity score for the two  treatment subgroups
in each plots lies roughly in the same domain (horizontal axis).
Hence, the sub-populations of treated patients are still comparable
and not too heterogeneous on their observable health risk proﬁles,
when they are split by self-selection regime.
Appendix D.
Self-selection model with joint choice of procedure and bypassing
of the closest hospitalquality of access to healthcare: Does choice explain the gradient?
In Table D1 we  show the results for a Roy model for the
joint choice of selection into procedure and selection of bypass-
ing the closest hospital. The selection correction is computed
parametrically and based on the modiﬁcation of the Dubin and
 self-selection status.
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Table D1
Roy model with joint correction for choice of bypassing the closest hospital and procedure.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
CABG patients – bypassing the closest hospital
EDI  income 1st quintile 0.1299* 0.2387*** 0.2063*** 0.0622 0.1413*** 0.1615*** 0.0655 0.0795 0.0353
EDI  income 2nd quintile 0.0790 0.1950*** 0.0831* 0.0668* 0.1379*** 0.1755*** 0.0261 0.1040** 0.1417**
EDI  income 3rd quintile 0.0168 0.0845* 0.1577*** 0.0674 0.0673 0.1057*** 0.1113** 0.0703 0.0235
EDI  income 4th quintile -0.0239 0.0759 0.0348 0.0133 0.0092 0.1384*** 0.0815 0.0235 0.0467
Selection correction 1 0.1435 -0.1877* -0.5304*** -0.1159 0.0304 -0.0157 -0.9992*** -0.1767 -0.1528
Selection correction 2 1.4671** -0.2402 -1.6556*** -0.9507** -0.3961 0.0602 -1.3930*** -0.5345 -0.2145
Selection correction 3 1.5134** 0.0629 -0.8693 -0.2172 -0.3878 -0.0589 1.4203** -0.3329 0.1872
Selection correction 4 1.3843 0.4407 -0.6518 -0.0103 -0.0606 -0.1390 -0.7395 -0.7689 -1.2848**
Constant 5.6196*** 4.3065*** 3.7506*** 3.5749*** 3.4398*** 3.5693*** 4.7056*** 3.1947*** 3.1095***
CABG patients – choosing the closest hospital
EDI  income 1st quintile 0.3231*** 0.2423*** 0.1447*** 0.1553*** 0.1559*** 0.1116*** 0.1216*** 0.0673** 0.0915**
EDI  income 2nd quintile 0.2398*** 0.1653*** 0.1143*** 0.1242*** 0.1524*** 0.1448*** 0.1099*** 0.0716** 0.0556
EDI  income 3rd quintile 0.1948*** 0.0994** 0.1401*** 0.1094*** 0.0894*** 0.0405 0.0789** 0.0040 0.0718**
EDI  income 4th quintile 0.0269 0.0683* 0.0763** 0.0746** 0.0435 0.0693** 0.0419 -0.0025 0.0290
Selection correction 1 0.4425** -0.1876 0.2403 0.3175 -0.2225 -0.3966 0.0094 -0.2023 -0.0819
Selection correction 2 0.2123 -0.3353* -0.2835 -0.1094 -0.2841* -0.2369** 0.3056* 0.0511 0.1948*
Selection correction 3 0.9843** 0.5516 0.6292 0.3296 -0.0895 0.4122 -0.0133 -0.0504 -0.2675
Selection correction 4 1.2962** 1.0995* 1.4148** 0.7802 0.2199 0.6098** -0.4410 -0.2979 -0.5977*
Constant 4.8880*** 5.1171*** 5.2154*** 4.2758*** 4.0679*** 4.2878*** 3.1040*** 3.1771*** 2.8286***
PCI  patients – bypassing the closest hospital
EDI income 1st quintile 0.3005*** 0.2947*** 0.1851*** 0.1409*** 0.1219*** 0.2022*** 0.1729*** 0.1434*** 0.1411***
EDI  income 2nd quintile 0.2632*** 0.2754*** 0.1866*** 0.1502*** 0.1337*** 0.1551*** 0.1327*** 0.1631*** 0.1055***
EDI  income 3rd quintile 0.1904*** 0.1731*** 0.0875** 0.1173*** 0.0938*** 0.1491*** 0.1468*** 0.1309*** 0.0780***
EDI  income 4th quintile 0.0366 0.1146** -0.0051 0.0474 0.0633** 0.1074*** 0.0885*** 0.0990*** 0.0706**
Selection correction 1 -0.4432 -1.7725** 0.7086 0.7006 -0.9006 0.8850 -1.6384*** -0.6523 -0.6232
Selection correction 2 -1.4632 -1.0162 -0.6435 -0.0597 -1.2222** 0.4955 0.0408 -0.1519 0.1458
Selection correction 3 0.1203 0.4246*** -0.1077 0.0043 -0.0671 -0.0993 0.1486** -0.2483*** -0.0698
Selection correction 4 0.5363 1.4040** 0.1466 0.2880 -0.6262* -0.1983 -0.3049 -1.0517*** -0.3934
Constant 3.0727*** 3.1742*** 4.0644*** 3.7554*** 2.8033*** 3.5259*** 2.6148*** 2.8115*** 3.0442***
PCI  patients – choosing the closest hospital
EDI  income 1st quintile 0.3513*** 0.3094*** 0.2421*** 0.1750*** 0.1948*** 0.1462*** 0.0876*** 0.1052*** 0.1327***
EDI  income 2nd quintile 0.2932*** 0.2199*** 0.1972*** 0.1600*** 0.1837*** 0.0923*** 0.0654*** 0.0943*** 0.1175***
EDI  income 3rd quintile 0.2038*** 0.1413*** 0.1276*** 0.1155*** 0.1428*** 0.0436* 0.0789*** 0.0712*** 0.1030***
EDI  income 4th quintile 0.1021** 0.1034*** 0.0769*** 0.0233 0.0711*** 0.0360 0.0423** 0.0329 0.0343
Selection correction 1 -0.1947 -0.2666 -0.3714 -0.4835** -0.4667 -0.9468** -0.1649 -0.0197 -0.4650*
Selection correction 2 -0.6268 -1.2616*** -1.3795*** -0.3843 0.1909 -0.6834* -0.8073** -0.4645 0.0988
Selection correction 3 0.4207 0.4263 -0.1828 -0.1140 0.1630 0.4140** -0.1878 -0.3433** -0.3266**
Selection correction 4 0.4816 0.4529** 0.0691 -0.1169 -0.1133 0.1804 -0.0244 -0.1742 -0.3293***
Constant 3.2925*** 3.1745*** 3.3433*** 3.4709*** 3.6752*** 2.8312*** 2.8950*** 3.0352*** 3.2928***
Notes. Roy model on joint cardiac revascularisation procedures (CABG and PCI) sample based on multinomial logit selection correction. Exclusion restrictions in the 1st stage
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megression: a) differential distance between second and ﬁrst hospital site (by proced
hree  ones providing PCI. Controls: Age, age bands dummies, admission month, Ch
n  the previous year, hospital ﬁxed effects (except for 1st stage multinomial logit re
cFadden (1984) multinomial logit selection correction proposed
y Bourguignon et al. (2007). With this method, there are as many
election correction terms as the switching regimes, which are four
n our case: two for the choice of closest hospital bypassing and
wo for choice of procedure. Both exclusion restrictions based on
istance are used in the ﬁrst step multinomial logit regression.
Results: The estimation of the joint model for selection of hos-
ital bypassing and procedure suggests very similar results to
hose in Table 5 and Table 6. A positive and statistically signiﬁcant
ocio-economic gradient is found in each year for CABG patients
hoosing the closest hospital, as well as for both categories of PCI
atients. The estimates of the gradient for CABG patients bypass-
ng the closest hospital show a more erratic behaviour, and are
igniﬁcant for most but not all the years. It is likely that the esti-
ation is fuzzier in this case, as this is also the category with the
mallest sample size. However, the results for the remaining three
ategories clearly show a statistically signiﬁcant but decreasing
ocio-economic gradient in waiting time due to income depriva-Please cite this article in press as: Moscelli, G., et al., Socioeconomic ine
J. Health Econ. (2017), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2017.06.005
ion. The estimated coefﬁcients are larger and always signiﬁcant in
he most income deprived group, for both CABG and PCI patients
hoosing the closest hospitals. Hence, this conﬁrms that most of the
ore income-deprived patients needing cardiac revascularisationb) (average) distance between the ﬁrst three hospitals providing CABG and the ﬁrst
 comorbidities dummies, Gender, Number of diagnosis, Emergency Past utilization
on). * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
have been subject to waiting time inequalities due to SES in the
English NHS between 2002 and 2010.
Appendix E.
Fixed effects quantile regressions.
We  estimate quantile regression models accounting for hospi-
tal ﬁxed effects to test how the gradient differs at different points
of the waiting time distribution. Hospital ﬁxed effects are intro-
duced following the method proposed by Canay (2011). Provided
that hj is a pure location shift of the conditional quantile function,
the parameters of interest can be consistently identiﬁed by running
a quantile regression of the difference between the individual out-
come and the ﬁxed effects (wijn = wijn − hj) on the usual covariate
set. The outcome equation for the th conditional quantile (Q) is
given byquality of access to healthcare: Does choice explain the gradient?
Q(wij|yij, sij, xij) = ˇ 1 ′()yij + ˇ 2 ′()sij + ˇ 3 ′()xij + Q(εij()) (7)
The estimated waiting times by waiting times quantile are com-
puted as E[W |y = g] = exp[ ˆˇ 1,1,y()].
Please cite this article in press as: Moscelli, G., et al., Socioeconomic inequality of access to healthcare: Does choice explain the gradient?
J. Health Econ. (2017), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2017.06.005
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Table  E1
Quantile Regression with hospital ﬁxed effects (Eq. (7)). Income inequalities in waiting times. CABG patients.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Q10 EDI income 1st quintile 0.4781*** 0.3623*** 0.1852** 0.2308*** 0.1857** 0.2108** 0.1797** 0.1173* 0.1224
EDI  income 2nd quintile 0.3441*** 0.2063** 0.1333 0.3140*** 0.2455** 0.3423*** 0.1507* 0.1380* 0.0968
EDI  income 3rd quintile 0.1438 0.1042 0.3044*** 0.2311*** 0.1746* 0.2012** 0.1857** 0.0525 0.0831
EDI  income 4th quintile 0.0392 0.0204 0.0742 0.1675** 0.0227 0.2250*** 0.1355* 0.1347** 0.0665
Constant 2.6351*** 2.7324*** 2.4530*** 2.2791*** 2.4700*** 2.5190*** 2.5164*** 2.2392*** 2.1420***
Q25 EDI  income 1st quintile 0.4076*** 0.2912*** 0.2459*** 0.1217*** 0.1500*** 0.1073** 0.1029** 0.0274 0.0860*
EDI  income 2nd quintile 0.2803*** 0.2719*** 0.1611*** 0.1403*** 0.1658*** 0.2006*** 0.0201 0.0964** 0.0801*
EDI  income 3rd quintile 0.2522*** 0.1281** 0.2197*** 0.1473*** 0.1407*** 0.0958** 0.0925** 0.0676 0.1162***
EDI  income 4th quintile 0.0645 0.1213** 0.1196** 0.1193** 0.0463 0.1552*** 0.0445 0.0054 0.0747*
Constant 3.6949*** 3.6300*** 3.6097*** 3.3185*** 3.4895*** 3.4133*** 3.2577*** 3.0262*** 2.9401***
Q50 EDI  income 1st quintile 0.3345*** 0.1708*** 0.1266*** 0.0981*** 0.0909*** 0.0547*** 0.0417* 0.0500* 0.0348
EDI  income 2nd quintile 0.2652*** 0.1521*** 0.0754** 0.0649*** 0.0902*** 0.0586*** 0.0473** 0.0400 0.0556*
EDI  income 3rd quintile 0.1997*** 0.0900*** 0.0758*** 0.0503*** 0.0537*** 0.0145 0.0157 0.0177 0.0717**
EDI  income 4th quintile 0.0776** 0.0831*** 0.0688*** 0.0220 0.0123 0.0097 0.0121 -0.0058 0.0449
Constant 4.4834*** 4.2945*** 4.3179*** 3.9716*** 3.9942*** 3.8896*** 3.7613*** 3.6483*** 3.6208***
Q75 EDI  income 1st quintile 0.1666*** 0.1572*** 0.1038*** 0.1110*** 0.0733*** 0.0914*** 0.0478** 0.0699*** 0.0611**
EDI  income 2nd quintile 0.1154*** 0.1267*** 0.0583*** 0.0722*** 0.0678*** 0.0676*** 0.0580*** 0.0713*** 0.0764***
EDI  income 3rd quintile 0.0943*** 0.0758*** 0.0417** 0.0536*** 0.0123 0.0025 -0.0035 -0.0064 0.0165
EDI  income 4th quintile 0.0158 0.0513** 0.0130 0.0115 0.0007 0.0188 0.0009 -0.0169 0.0206
Constant 5.0263*** 4.7974*** 4.8169*** 4.2386*** 4.2504*** 4.2022*** 4.1475*** 4.1075*** 4.0677***
Q90 EDI  income 1st quintile 0.1246*** 0.1572*** 0.1269*** 0.2071*** 0.1492*** 0.1270*** 0.0634** 0.1068*** 0.0931**
EDI  income 2nd quintile 0.0673** 0.0826*** 0.0832*** 0.0963*** 0.0672** 0.1195*** 0.0547** 0.0808*** 0.0730**
EDI  income 3rd quintile 0.0729*** 0.0235 0.0261 0.1418*** 0.0097 0.0181 -0.0061 0.0186 -0.0086
EDI  income 4th quintile -0.0398 0.0064 0.0114 0.0423 0.0064 0.0492* -0.0252 -0.0341 -0.0359
Constant 5.4508*** 5.2016*** 5.1144*** 4.4868*** 4.5393*** 4.5039*** 4.4267*** 4.3707*** 4.4607***
Patients 14654 14213 14074 12060 11536 12218 11829 10000 8888
Notes. Sample: CABG patients only. Controls: Age, age bands dummies, Charlson comorbidities dummies, Gender, Number of diagnosis, Emergency Past utilization in the
previous  year, hospital ﬁxed effects. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table E2
Quantile Regression with hospital ﬁxed effects (Eq. (7)). Income inequalities in waiting times. PCI patients.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Q10 EDI income 1st quintile 0.5347*** 0.6444*** 0.4813*** 0.3905*** 0.4859*** 0.4600*** 0.2968*** 0.3182*** 0.3839***
EDI  income 2nd quintile 0.4944*** 0.5205*** 0.4590*** 0.4294*** 0.4193*** 0.3107*** 0.2569*** 0.2808*** 0.3241***
EDI  income 3rd quintile 0.3526*** 0.2711*** 0.2661*** 0.2765*** 0.3062*** 0.2480*** 0.2604*** 0.2150*** 0.2933***
EDI  income 4th quintile 0.1697*** 0.1847*** 0.1071* 0.0948* 0.1548*** 0.1789*** 0.1513*** 0.1225** 0.1468***
Constant 2.2762*** 2.1458*** 2.6752*** 2.4491*** 2.3963*** 1.9818*** 2.1178*** 2.0808*** 2.0726***
Q25 EDI  income 1st quintile 0.5478*** 0.4538*** 0.3173*** 0.2200*** 0.2393*** 0.1999*** 0.1251*** 0.1640*** 0.1394***
EDI  income 2nd quintile 0.4572*** 0.3758*** 0.2781*** 0.1969*** 0.2126*** 0.1406*** 0.1156*** 0.1771*** 0.1437***
EDI  income 3rd quintile 0.2863*** 0.2468*** 0.1435*** 0.1612*** 0.1671*** 0.1349*** 0.1197*** 0.1322*** 0.1216***
EDI  income 4th quintile 0.0950* 0.1418*** 0.1018*** 0.0475 0.0994*** 0.1159*** 0.0722*** 0.0731*** 0.0756***
Constant 3.1844*** 3.3229*** 3.5771*** 3.2415*** 3.2364*** 2.8132*** 2.8449*** 2.8313*** 2.8654***
Q50 EDI  income 1st quintile 0.4000*** 0.2463*** 0.1590*** 0.0902*** 0.0993*** 0.0637*** 0.0575*** 0.0667*** 0.0762***
EDI  income 2nd quintile 0.3139*** 0.2306*** 0.1374*** 0.0882*** 0.0977*** 0.0580*** 0.0590*** 0.0527*** 0.0706***
EDI  income 3rd quintile 0.1906*** 0.1495*** 0.0633*** 0.0762*** 0.0585*** 0.0616*** 0.0710*** 0.0507*** 0.0624***
EDI  income 4th quintile 0.0580* 0.1045*** 0.0477** 0.0155 0.0382*** 0.0446*** 0.0367** 0.0239 0.0427***
Constant 4.0244*** 4.2324*** 4.1930*** 3.8407*** 3.7552*** 3.4175*** 3.3684*** 3.3757*** 3.3635***
Q75 EDI  income 1st quintile 0.2892*** 0.1276*** 0.0786*** 0.0560*** 0.0475*** 0.0433*** 0.0336** 0.0429*** 0.0331**
EDI  income 2nd quintile 0.2042*** 0.1341*** 0.0629*** 0.0592*** 0.0642*** 0.0433*** 0.0300** 0.0398*** 0.0444***
EDI  income 3rd quintile 0.1620*** 0.0748*** 0.0238 0.0477*** 0.0346*** 0.0194 0.0302** 0.0313** 0.0353***
EDI  income 4th quintile 0.0418 0.0504*** -0.0057 0.0095 0.0180 0.0181 0.0139 0.0192 0.0136
Constant 4.6330*** 4.7744*** 4.6121*** 4.1564*** 4.1107*** 3.8019*** 3.7545*** 3.7348*** 3.7794***
Q90 EDI  income 1st quintile 0.2444*** 0.1234*** 0.0630*** 0.0330** 0.0417*** 0.0212 0.0190 0.0263 0.0100
EDI  income 2nd quintile 0.1551*** 0.0939*** 0.0611*** 0.0401*** 0.0645*** 0.0211 0.0277 0.0313* 0.0300
EDI  income 3rd quintile 0.1178*** 0.0352 0.0184 0.0106 0.0480*** -0.0083 0.0167 0.0252 0.0116
EDI  income 4th quintile 0.0346 0.0021 -0.0075 -0.0168 0.0272** -0.0109 0.0029 0.0107 -0.0163
Constant 5.0896*** 5.1053*** 4.9312*** 4.3945*** 4.3773*** 4.1261*** 4.0557*** 4.0240*** 4.0714***
Patients 16095 20140 24355 25632 26772 25545 25399 23861 23759
Notes. Sample: PCI patients only. Controls: Age, age bands dummies, Charlson comorbidities dummies, Gender, Number of diagnosis, Emergency Past utilization in the
previous year, hospital ﬁxed effects. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Figure E1 shows the estimated waiting times for the ﬁrst, third
nd ﬁfth SES quintile groups, at the 25th and 75th quantiles of the
aiting times distribution (the full results for quantile regressions
re provided in Tables E1 and E2). Socioeconomic inequalities are
ound both when the waiting times are short (25th quantile) or
ong (75th quantile). Hence, inequalities affected the entire waiting
ime distribution and were not conﬁned to hospitals with either
elatively short or long waiting times.
A larger relative socioeconomic gradient in waiting times isPlease cite this article in press as: Moscelli, G., et al., Socioeconomic ine
J. Health Econ. (2017), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2017.06.005
ound at lower conditional waiting times (25th quantile), for both
ABG and PCI patients, across all years. This pattern is consistent
ith severely ill patients, who have a relatively short expected
able F1
oy model. Income inequalities in CABG waiting times, with selection of hospital based o
(1) (2) (3) 
2002 2003 2004 
Patients not choosing the closes
EDI income 1st quintile 0.1599*** 0.2297*** 0.2269*** 0
EDI  income 2nd quintile 0.1082** 0.1919*** 0.0858* 0
EDI  income 3rd quintile 0.0462 0.0944* 0.1560*** 0
EDI  income 4th quintile -0.0060 0.0773 0.0383 
IMR1  - Not closest 0.0676 0.2534*** 0.2603*** 
Constant 4.3409*** 4.2039*** 4.3749*** 3
Patients choosing the closest C
EDI income 1st quintile 0.3657*** 0.2529*** 0.1476*** 0
EDI  income 2nd quintile 0.2710*** 0.1859*** 0.1166*** 0
EDI  income 3rd quintile 0.2168*** 0.1051*** 0.1290*** 0
EDI  income 4th quintile 0.0423 0.0566 0.0694** 0
IMR0  – Closest -0.0273 -0.0237 -0.0919** -
Constant 4.1944*** 4.2033*** 4.0651*** 3
1st Stage Probit for Choice of provider by distance: CLO
Distance difference 2nd - 1st provider -0.0351*** -0.0183*** -0.0202*** -0
(difference in CABG mortality rates) 0.0268 0.0280** 0.0357*** 0
w  (difference in CABG long waits) -1.0344*** -0.4551*** -0.8113*** -0
Specialist closest hospital 0.0287 -0.1089** -0.1395*** -
EDI  income 1st quintile -0.1875*** -0.1483*** -0.1890*** -0
EDI  income 2nd quintile -0.0229 0.0110 -0.0132 -0
EDI  income 3rd quintile -0.0257 -0.0260 -0.0189 -
EDI  income 4th quintile -0.0355 0.0048 -0.0417 -
Constant 0.2815*** 0.0264 0.0895 0
Patients 14654 13678 14074 
Chi-squared p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Pseudo R2 0.15 0.08 0.09 
otes. Sample: CABG patients only. Controls: Age, age bands dummies, Charlson comorb
revious year, hospital ﬁxed effects (in Eq.(4) and (5) only). * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.
able F2
oy model. Income inequalities in PCI waiting times, with selection of hospital based on d
(1) (2) (3) 
2002 2003 2004 
Patients not choosing the close
EDI income 1st quintile 0.4109*** 0.2626*** 0.2011*** 0.
EDI  income 2nd quintile 0.3289*** 0.2338*** 0.2118*** 0.
EDI  income 3rd quintile 0.2501*** 0.1143** 0.1198*** 0.
EDI  income 4th quintile 0.0616 0.0767* 0.0161 0
IMR1  - Not closest -0.0855* -0.0408 -0.0302 -
Constant 3.5364*** 3.8925*** 3.8744*** 3.
Patients choosing the closest
EDI income 1st quintile 0.4365*** 0.3239*** 0.2519*** 0.
EDI  income 2nd quintile 0.3466*** 0.2400*** 0.2022*** 0.
EDI  income 3rd quintile 0.2410*** 0.1470*** 0.1207*** 0.
EDI  income 4th quintile 0.1327*** 0.0924*** 0.0808*** 0
IMR0  – Closest 0.1191*** 0.0223 -0.0040 -
Constant 3.8224*** 3.9053*** 3.9699*** 3.
1st Stage Probit for Choice of provider by distance: CL
Distance difference 2nd - 1st provider -0.0374*** -0.0416*** -0.0420*** -0
(difference in PCI mortality rates) 0.0473* 0.2004*** 0.6574*** -0 PRESS
conomics xxx (2017) xxx–xxx
waiting time but a larger risk of dying while waiting, having a
greater incentive to play the system than those in less severe con-
ditions. In line with previous results, the relative income gradient
decreases almost monotonically over time.
Quantile regressions results show that inequalities are pervasive
and present across the waiting time distribution.quality of access to healthcare: Does choice explain the gradient?
Robustness checks on Roy Model on closest hospital bypassing.
n distance, quality and waiting times
(4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
t CABG hospital site – Eq. (4)
.0821* 0.1427*** 0.1516*** 0.0183 0.0952** 0.0657
.0796** 0.1351*** 0.1723*** 0.0150 0.1087** 0.1577***
.0716* 0.0689 0.0739* 0.0656 0.0720 0.0232
0.0273 0.0104 0.0923** 0.0140 0.0261 0.0488
0.0116 -0.0463 0.0880** 0.1386*** 0.0217 -0.0674
.7719*** 3.7315*** 3.7080*** 3.6457*** 3.5746*** 3.3679***
ABG hospital site – Eq. (5)
.1678*** 0.1759*** 0.1150*** 0.1100*** 0.0689** 0.1019***
.1401*** 0.1523*** 0.1522*** 0.0985*** 0.0708** 0.0607*
.1168*** 0.0932*** 0.0514 0.0683** 0.0057 0.0850**
.0880*** 0.0512 0.0781** 0.0433 -0.0010 0.0268
0.0237 0.0270 -0.0195 0.0426 -0.0043 0.0692*
.6272*** 3.7028*** 3.7162*** 3.6197*** 3.4278*** 3.4190***
SEST vs NOT CLOSEST hospital - only CABG – Eq. (3)
.0318*** -0.0367*** -0.0320*** -0.0299*** -0.0318*** -0.0385***
.1075*** -0.0346** -0.0517*** -0.1481*** -0.1537*** -0.2211***
.7125*** 0.0482 -0.4762*** -0.0667 0.8455*** 1.2529***
0.0652 -0.0140 -0.1033 -0.1518** -0.0242 -0.1847**
.2837*** -0.3223*** -0.2513*** -0.2956*** -0.2382*** -0.2218***
.0948** -0.0142 -0.1419*** -0.0584 -0.0815* -0.0425
0.0253 -0.0807** -0.0956** -0.1003** -0.0030 -0.0288
0.0486 -0.0664 -0.1320*** 0.0097 0.0151 0.0341
.2007*** 0.2780*** 0.1744*** 0.1050 0.1946*** 0.3120***
12060 11536 11245 11635 10000 8888
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.16 0.19 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.20
idities dummies, Gender, Number of diagnosis, Emergency Past utilization in the
01.
istance, quality and waiting times
(4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
st PCI hospital site – Eq. (4)
1527*** 0.1303*** 0.2050*** 0.1225*** 0.1496*** 0.1245***
1664*** 0.1066*** 0.1604*** 0.1404*** 0.1592*** 0.1038***
1270*** 0.0984*** 0.1425*** 0.1130*** 0.1212*** 0.0701**
.0707** 0.0652** 0.1171*** 0.0358 0.0967*** 0.0565*
0.0341 -0.0126 -0.0521 -0.0226 0.0451 -0.0076
3853*** 3.5481*** 3.1311*** 3.1944*** 3.2669*** 3.2044***
 PCI hospital site – Eq. (5)
1862*** 0.1880*** 0.1345*** 0.1047*** 0.1054*** 0.1386***
1837*** 0.1864*** 0.1036*** 0.0755*** 0.0872*** 0.1235***
1326*** 0.1327*** 0.0519** 0.0880*** 0.0668*** 0.1086***
.0342 0.0709*** 0.0276 0.0375* 0.0296 0.0353*
0.0152 -0.0408* 0.0049 -0.0038 0.0257 0.0241
6210*** 3.5696*** 3.2635*** 3.2400*** 3.1571*** 3.2163***
OSEST vs NOT CLOSEST hospital - only PCI – Eq. (3)
.0512*** -0.0477*** -0.0195*** -0.0322*** -0.0412*** -0.0450***
.2752*** -0.1853*** 0.5335*** 0.0298* 0.1716*** 0.6811***
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Table  F2 (Continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(difference in PCI long waits) -0.8491*** -0.6840*** -0.1305*** 0.1888*** 1.0622*** 0.5846*** -0.2134*** 0.2489*** 1.0689***
Specialist closest hospital 0.0150 0.0285 0.0464 0.0996* -0.4429*** -0.4665*** -1.0110*** -0.8188*** -0.3209***
EDI  income 1st quintile -0.4033*** -0.2966*** -0.3241*** -0.3528*** -0.1135*** -0.0472 -0.0022 -0.1492*** -0.1918***
EDI  income 2nd quintile -0.1345*** -0.0940*** -0.0460 -0.0747** -0.0335 0.0637** 0.1000*** -0.0145 -0.1131***
EDI  income 3rd quintile -0.1082*** -0.0341 -0.0540* -0.0824** -0.0008 0.0810*** 0.0770*** 0.0206 -0.0101
EDI  income 4th quintile -0.1433*** -0.0231 -0.0457 -0.0092 -0.0353 0.0428 0.0932*** 0.0208 0.0178
Constant 0.2801*** 0.2235*** 0.2040*** 0.2473*** 0.3624*** -0.0829* 0.0004 0.0594 0.1675***
Patients 15600 18413 23668 20524 23470 21814 22767 22609 22196
Chi-squared p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pseudo R-squared 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.16 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.14
N
p
A
R
T
R
N
potes. Sample: PCI patients only. Controls: Age, age bands dummies, Charlson comorbidities dummies, Gender, Number of diagnosis, Emergency Past utilization in the
revious year, hospital ﬁxed effects (in Eq.(4) and (5) only). * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
ppendix G.
obustness checks on Roy model with selection on heart revascularization procedure.
able G1
oy Model estimates with selection of procedure, including interactions of SES indicators with comorbidities and past emergency admissions.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Patients choosing CABG – Eq. (4)
EDI income 1st quintile 0.3700*** 0.2246*** 0.1630*** 0.1352*** 0.1582*** 0.1263*** 0.0695*** 0.0785*** 0.0953***
EDI  income 2nd quintile 0.2615*** 0.1724*** 0.1034*** 0.1160*** 0.1443*** 0.1621*** 0.0676*** 0.0814*** 0.0938***
EDI  income 3rd quintile 0.1929*** 0.0898*** 0.1408*** 0.0989*** 0.0867*** 0.0717*** 0.0479** 0.0268 0.0691**
EDI  income 4th quintile 0.0477 0.0656** 0.0595** 0.0642** 0.0334 0.0949*** 0.0243 0.0082 0.0292
IMR1 - CABG -0.6570** 0.6399** 0.5899*** -0.0316 0.2994 0.0443 -0.1516 0.0696 0.1594
Constant 3.8657*** 4.5790*** 4.2556*** 3.6980*** 4.1648*** 3.9892*** 3.2212*** 3.1647*** 3.3939***
Patients choosing PCI – Eq. (5)
EDI income 1st quintile 0.4928*** 0.3122*** 0.2289*** 0.1675*** 0.1672*** 0.1664*** 0.1096*** 0.1207*** 0.1391***
EDI  income 2nd quintile 0.3893*** 0.2585*** 0.1982*** 0.1643*** 0.1633*** 0.1185*** 0.0987*** 0.1208*** 0.1221***
EDI  income 3rd quintile 0.2743*** 0.1566*** 0.1119*** 0.1201*** 0.1181*** 0.0896*** 0.0987*** 0.0895*** 0.0924***
EDI  income 4th quintile 0.1328*** 0.0988*** 0.0502** 0.0420** 0.0667*** 0.0674*** 0.0497*** 0.0548*** 0.0524***
IMR0  - PCI -0.6769* 0.4395 0.1547 -0.2085 0.1113 0.2402 -0.2050 -0.3411** -0.3898***
Constant 4.1241*** 3.6822*** 3.9812*** 3.7254*** 3.4458*** 2.9850*** 3.5187*** 3.3813*** 3.3805***
1st  Stage Probit for Choice of procedure: CABG vs PCI – Eq. (3), including (past admissions, co-morbidities) * SES interactions
Differential distance of ﬁrst 3
hospitals by procedure
-0.0016*** 0.0001 -0.0013*** -0.0008** -0.0004 0.0009*** -0.0003 -0.0008** -0.0020***
EDI  income 1st quintile 0.1829*** 0.0212 -0.0019 0.0630** 0.0333 0.0171 0.0111 0.0473* 0.0232
EDI  income 2nd quintile 0.1234*** 0.0217 -0.0337 0.0693*** 0.0000 0.0262 0.0388 0.0390 0.0213
EDI  income 3rd quintile 0.1006*** -0.0065 -0.0487** 0.0345 -0.0291 0.0245 0.0047 0.0456* -0.0362
EDI  income 4th quintile 0.0738*** -0.0174 -0.0403* 0.0631** 0.0141 0.0103 -0.0314 0.0031 0.0522*
Number of comorbidities (N.C.) 0.1112*** 0.1044*** 0.1116*** 0.1245*** 0.1424*** 0.1496*** 0.1659*** 0.1693*** 0.1941***
EDI  income 1st quintile * N.C. 0.0205* 0.0068 -0.0075 -0.0202** -0.0238*** -0.0213** -0.0062 -0.0167* -0.0385***
EDI  income 2nd quintile * N.C. 0.0067 0.0143 0.0043 -0.0224** -0.0112 -0.0129 -0.0136 -0.0065 -0.0172*
EDI  income 3rd quintile * N.C. 0.0165 0.0001 0.0185** -0.0134 0.0034 -0.0013 -0.0056 -0.0055 -0.0078
EDI  income 4th quintile * N.C. -0.0020 0.0081 0.0134 0.0067 -0.0002 -0.0013 -0.0120 -0.0035 0.0023
Number of past year emergency
admissions (N.P.A.)
-0.1417*** -0.1405*** -0.1884*** -0.0939*** -0.1324*** -0.1072*** -0.1250*** -0.0657** -0.1710***
EDI  income 1st quintile * N.P.A. -0.0025 -0.0024 0.0869*** -0.0378 0.0082 -0.0287 -0.0371 -0.1140*** -0.0162
EDI  income 2nd quintile * N.P.A. 0.0128 0.0358 0.1097*** 0.0059 0.0254 -0.0278 -0.0201 -0.0676* -0.0161
EDI  income 3rd quintile * N.P.A. -0.0293 0.0345 0.0885** 0.0209 0.0321 -0.0028 -0.0172 -0.1165*** 0.0179
EDI  income 4th quintile * N.P.A. -0.0306 -0.0103 0.0693** -0.0262 -0.0436 -0.0529 0.0179 -0.0048 -0.0824**
Constant -0.0760** -0.1647*** -0.2912*** -0.4942*** -0.4229*** -0.3062*** -0.3803*** -0.4830*** -0.5787***
Patients 30749 34353 38429 37692 38308 37763 37228 33861 32647
Chi-squared p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00Please cite this article in press as: Moscelli, G., et al., Socioeconomic ine
J. Health Econ. (2017), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2017.06.005
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Table G2
Roy Model estimates with selection of procedure, including differential Length of Stay and interactions of Length of Stay with SES indicators.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Patients choosing CABG – Eq. (4)
EDI income 1st quintile 0.3205*** 0.2336*** 0.1647*** 0.1350*** 0.1536*** 0.1261*** 0.0661** 0.0784*** 0.0928***
EDI  income 2nd quintile 0.2294*** 0.1752*** 0.1029*** 0.1165*** 0.1420*** 0.1630*** 0.0705*** 0.0810*** 0.0925***
EDI  income 3rd quintile 0.1681*** 0.0905*** 0.1398*** 0.0992*** 0.0871*** 0.0737*** 0.0469* 0.0267 0.0679**
EDI  income 4th quintile 0.0323 0.0677** 0.0585** 0.0647** 0.0338 0.0943*** 0.0193 0.0081 0.0300
IMR1  - CABG -0.2822 0.6291** 0.4279* -0.0481 0.3363 -0.0887 -0.3686** 0.1015 0.1415
Constant 4.1918*** 4.5481*** 4.0854*** 3.6809*** 4.2090*** 3.8500*** 2.9991*** 3.2006*** 3.3729***
Patients choosing PCI – Eq. (5)
EDI income 1st quintile 0.4683*** 0.3166*** 0.2305*** 0.1648*** 0.1671*** 0.1669*** 0.1093*** 0.1183*** 0.1362***
EDI  income 2nd quintile 0.3734*** 0.2589*** 0.1980*** 0.1615*** 0.1633*** 0.1199*** 0.0961*** 0.1213*** 0.1214***
EDI  income 3rd quintile 0.2652*** 0.1572*** 0.1102*** 0.1185*** 0.1180*** 0.0914*** 0.0984*** 0.0895*** 0.0904***
EDI  income 4th quintile 0.1245*** 0.0986*** 0.0487** 0.0401** 0.0666*** 0.0671*** 0.0511*** 0.0545*** 0.0543***
IMR0  - PCI -0.5246** 0.4311 0.0046 -0.1432 0.1239 0.0965 -0.0627 -0.5403*** -0.5110***
Constant 4.0248*** 3.6747*** 4.0732*** 3.6952*** 3.4396*** 3.0741*** 3.4367*** 3.4918*** 3.4448***
1st Stage Probit for Choice of procedure: CABG vs PCI – Eq. (3), including average 
LoS and average 
LoS *SES interactions
Differential distance of ﬁrst 3
hospitals by procedure
-0.0001 0.0010** -0.0007** -0.0001 -0.0008** 0.0005 0.0004 -0.0007* -0.0020***
LoS  in closest 5 Hospitals -0.0619** -0.0476*** 0.0081 -0.0756*** 0.0711*** -0.0055 -0.1123*** -0.0100 0.0049
EDI  income 1st quintile 1.1201*** 0.1568 0.4020* -0.7123** -0.1391 -1.3146*** -1.5008*** 0.5644 0.0817
EDI  income 2nd quintile 1.2468*** 0.1539 0.2165 0.0835 0.4529 -0.5776** -0.6765** -0.0339 0.1988
EDI  income 3rd quintile 1.1523*** 0.1863 0.7270*** -0.0288 0.3903 -0.1376 -0.3096 -0.2154 -0.1191
EDI  income 4th quintile 0.9034*** -0.2348 0.1402 -0.1626 0.0277 -0.5212* -0.9035*** -0.0021 0.4259
EDI  income 1st quintile * LoS -0.1027*** -0.0166 -0.0388* 0.0742** 0.0181 0.1280*** 0.1521*** -0.0581 -0.0084
EDI  income 2nd quintile * LoS -0.1194*** -0.0130 -0.0217 -0.0044 -0.0439 0.0572** 0.0702** 0.0047 -0.0182
EDI  income 3rd quintile * LoS -0.1124*** -0.0190 -0.0737*** 0.0052 -0.0402 0.0157 0.0303 0.0217 0.0086
EDI  income 4th quintile * LoS -0.0890** 0.0207 -0.0156 0.0217 -0.0025 0.0495* 0.0876*** 0.0003 -0.0383
Constant 0.5213** 0.3131** -0.3932** 0.2788 -1.1460*** -0.2439 0.7439*** -0.3610 -0.6208*
Patients 30749 34353 38429 37692 38308 37763 37228 33861 32647
Chi-squared p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pseudo R-squared 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.13
Notes. Sample: CABG and PCI patients. Controls: Age, age bands dummies, Charlson comorbidities dummies, Gender, Number of diagnosis, Emergency Past utilization in the
previous year, hospital ﬁxed effects (in Eq. (4) and (5) only). * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table G3
Full estimates of Roy Model in Table 8 (excluding hospital sites ﬁxed effects). Income inequalities in waiting times on CABG and PCI samples, after accounting for selection
of  revascularisation procedure.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Panel A – Patients choosing CABG – Eq. (4)
EDI income 1st quintile (most
deprived)
0.3605*** 0.2238*** 0.1614*** 0.1319*** 0.1544*** 0.1260*** 0.0695*** 0.0783*** 0.0927***
EDI  income 2nd quintile 0.2557*** 0.1711*** 0.1028*** 0.1107*** 0.1425*** 0.1623*** 0.0708*** 0.0809*** 0.0925***
EDI  income 3rd quintile 0.1868*** 0.0894*** 0.1423*** 0.0959*** 0.0878*** 0.0724*** 0.0481* 0.0267 0.0679**
EDI  income 4th quintile 0.0450 0.0685** 0.0602** 0.0578** 0.0336 0.0947*** 0.0225 0.0080 0.0300
Patient age 0.0041 -0.0020 0.0014 -0.0007 0.0009 0.0040 0.0032 -0.0014 0.0067**
age  range 0-39 years -0.1175 -0.1880 0.0379 0.0296 0.1356 -0.0293 -0.1390 -0.1620 0.0222
age  range 40-49 years -0.1383 -0.0089 0.1460** -0.1085 -0.0394 0.0071 -0.0225 -0.0636 0.0849
age  range 50-59 years -0.0655 0.0160 0.0340 -0.0243 0.0077 -0.0141 -0.0204 -0.0555 0.0363
age  range 70-79 years 0.0392 -0.0382 -0.0374 0.0457 -0.0027 -0.0010 -0.0089 0.0219 -0.0055
age  range over 80 years -0.2443** 0.0540 0.0691 0.1356 0.1592* -0.0246 -0.0897 0.0519 -0.0369
Female patient -0.0470 0.2396*** 0.2003*** 0.0798 0.1274* 0.0385 -0.0048 0.0918 0.0223
Number of Comorbidities 0.0402* -0.0330 -0.0350* 0.0040 -0.0287 0.0153 0.0456* -0.0049 -0.0106
Past  Year Emergency Admissions -0.3317*** -0.1760*** -0.1584*** -0.1233*** -0.0795*** -0.1183*** -0.1542*** -0.0571** -0.0619**
Congestive Heart Failure 0.2622** -0.3133** -0.1999** -0.1132 -0.0627 0.0255 0.0400 -0.0085 0.0047
Peripheral Vascular Disease 0.1157** -0.0566 -0.0223 0.0208 0.0297 0.0183 0.0118 0.0287 -0.0175
Cerebrovascular Disease 0.1314 -0.1396 -0.1803* 0.0570 -0.0457 -0.0310 -0.0754 -0.0383 0.0025
Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary
Disease (COPD)
0.0319 0.1578*** 0.1172*** 0.0572* 0.0495 -0.0197 0.0172 -0.0114 0.0553*
Rheumatoid Disease -0.1438 -0.0723 0.0337 -0.0684 -0.0643 0.0114 -0.0199 -0.0017 0.0346
Peptic Ulcer Disease -0.0701 0.0615 0.0074 0.0011 -0.0928 -0.1765 0.0120 -0.1600 -0.2659*
Mild  Liver Disease -0.0901 0.0450 -0.1702 0.1877 0.4365*** -0.1830 0.0515 0.2816** 0.1551
Diabetes 0.0714** 0.0644** 0.0758*** 0.0322 0.0329* 0.0262 0.0199 0.0426* 0.0695***
Diabetes + Complications 0.0167 0.0195 0.1485 0.0798 0.2272*** 0.0329 0.0705 0.1671** 0.0756
Renal  Disease 0.1017 0.1187* 0.0534 0.0868 0.0459 0.0781 0.0588 0.1023** 0.0291
Cancer -0.2728** -0.1908 -0.1763 -0.4280*** -0.1193 -0.4230*** -0.4257*** 0.1096 -0.3735***
Jan  0.1689*** 0.0814* 0.1217*** 0.2626*** 0.1461*** 0.1662*** 0.1621*** 0.1289*** 0.1933***
Feb  0.0438 0.1891*** 0.1061** 0.1987*** 0.0951** 0.1177*** 0.0740* 0.0844* 0.2846***
Mar  0.0640 0.1113** 0.0271 0.1936*** 0.0219 0.0606 0.0096 0.0432 0.1066**
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Table  G3 (Continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
April 0.2830*** -0.1214** 0.1006** 0.1361*** 0.0887** 0.0671 0.1383*** 0.1264*** 0.0844
May  0.2199*** -0.0741 0.0348 0.0869* 0.1446*** 0.1075** 0.0802* 0.1149** 0.0424
June  0.3488*** -0.0313 -0.0318 0.1007** 0.0988** 0.1292*** 0.1136*** 0.0981** 0.0563
July  0.2906*** -0.0521 0.0794* 0.0429 0.0644 0.0728* 0.1296*** 0.0664 -0.0385
Aug  0.2546*** -0.0690 0.0355 -0.0039 0.0832** 0.0669* 0.1992*** 0.0266 -0.0311
Sept  0.3280*** -0.1379*** 0.0652 0.0872** 0.0971** 0.0752* 0.1818*** 0.0587 0.0681
Oct  0.2415*** -0.0355 0.0496 0.0684 0.0431 0.1141*** 0.0763* -0.0397 0.0371
IMR1 - CABG -0.5930** 0.7736** 0.5971** 0.1162 0.3761 -0.0025 -0.2828 0.1087 0.1413
Constant 3.9205*** 4.7000*** 4.2609*** 3.8637*** 4.2500*** 3.9414*** 3.0829*** 3.2087*** 3.3728***
Hospital sites Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Panel B - Patients choosing PCI – Eq. (5)
EDI income 1st quintile (most
deprived)
0.5063*** 0.3105*** 0.2323*** 0.1661*** 0.1688*** 0.1670*** 0.1093*** 0.1189*** 0.1364***
EDI  income 2nd quintile 0.3974*** 0.2556*** 0.1977*** 0.1622*** 0.1638*** 0.1193*** 0.0988*** 0.1215*** 0.1214***
EDI  income 3rd quintile 0.2819*** 0.1568*** 0.1083*** 0.1189*** 0.1171*** 0.0903*** 0.0985*** 0.0898*** 0.0906***
EDI  income 4th quintile 0.1365*** 0.0998*** 0.0469** 0.0406** 0.0667*** 0.0672*** 0.0486*** 0.0547*** 0.0541***
Patient age 0.0039 0.0012 0.0022 0.0023 0.0039** 0.0039** 0.0045** 0.0031 -0.0003
age  range 0-39 years -0.2899** -0.1326 -0.0907 -0.0282 0.0030 -0.0414 0.0325 -0.0689 -0.0783
age  range 40-49 years -0.1659** -0.0185 -0.0942* -0.0602 0.0331 -0.0027 -0.0036 -0.0392 -0.0973**
age  range 50-59 years -0.1166*** -0.0117 -0.0582** -0.0180 0.0012 0.0080 -0.0062 -0.0416* -0.0399*
age  range 70-79 years 0.0138 -0.0415 -0.0162 0.0205 -0.0068 -0.0219 -0.0100 0.0226 0.0349
age  range over 80 years -0.2598** -0.0339 -0.0841 -0.0213 -0.0519 -0.0373 -0.1009** -0.1010** -0.0168
Female patient -0.0350 0.1720** 0.0335 0.0269 0.0473 0.0731** 0.0004 -0.0522* -0.0421**
Number of Comorbidities 0.0822*** -0.0105 0.0294 0.0322** 0.0189 0.0094 0.0356*** 0.0633*** 0.0641***
Past  Year Emergency Admissions -0.2618*** -0.1470*** -0.1390*** -0.0967*** -0.0840*** -0.0521*** -0.0555*** -0.0554*** -0.0574***
Congestive Heart Failure 0.4385* -0.3581* 0.0974 0.0612 -0.0334 -0.0677 -0.0443 0.0181 0.0148
Peripheral Vascular Disease 0.1071 -0.0958* 0.0107 0.0344 -0.0377 0.0284 -0.0104 0.0216 -0.0057
Cerebrovascular Disease 0.1338 -0.2785* 0.0446 0.0232 -0.0204 -0.0668 -0.0104 0.1489* -0.0049
Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary
Disease (COPD)
-0.0242 0.0366 0.0067 -0.0227 0.0268 -0.0095 -0.0153 -0.0385* -0.0092
Rheumatoid Disease -0.2182* 0.1538 -0.0084 -0.0459 0.0052 0.0303 -0.0008 0.0436 -0.1250***
Peptic Ulcer Disease 0.2453 0.0024 0.1484 0.1976* -0.3109** -0.0050 0.1627 0.0040 0.1584
Mild  Liver Disease -0.0437 -0.5138 -0.0825 -0.3445 0.1868* -0.3831** 0.0867 -0.0785 0.0072
Diabetes 0.0674** 0.0169 0.0291* 0.0011 0.0126 0.0312** -0.0019 0.0062 0.0035
Diabetes + Complications 0.0173 0.1285 -0.2658** -0.0360 -0.0088 0.0586 0.0699 -0.1397* -0.0521
Renal  Disease -0.0679 0.0894 -0.1970*** -0.0036 -0.0303 0.0553 -0.0723** 0.0088 -0.0732**
Cancer -0.5820*** -0.6193*** -0.6811*** -0.4789*** -0.2419*** -0.2565*** -0.3410*** -0.3030*** -0.3702***
Jan  0.1499*** 0.2542*** 0.1778*** 0.1635*** 0.1770*** 0.2005*** 0.1864*** 0.2591*** 0.2553***
Feb  0.1046** 0.2199*** 0.1316*** 0.1590*** 0.0894*** 0.1016*** 0.1120*** 0.1523*** 0.1230***
Mar  0.1160** 0.1639*** 0.1194*** 0.1004*** -0.0035 0.0687** 0.0689*** 0.1099*** 0.1309***
April  -0.0028 -0.1379** 0.0459 0.2050*** 0.0950*** 0.3907*** 0.0876*** 0.1347*** 0.1734***
May  -0.0046 0.0247 0.0337 0.1293*** 0.1336*** 0.3507*** 0.0144 0.1187*** 0.1298***
June  0.0434 0.0627 0.1272*** 0.1665*** 0.0866*** 0.3923*** 0.0846*** 0.1654*** 0.1784***
July  0.0845* -0.0083 0.0791** 0.1020*** 0.0386 0.2831*** 0.0513** 0.0465* 0.0761***
Aug  0.1131** 0.0233 0.1471*** 0.0976*** 0.0784*** 0.2844*** 0.0425 0.0901*** 0.0974***
Sept  0.0919* 0.0454 0.1234*** 0.1286*** 0.0863*** 0.2493*** 0.1098*** 0.1433*** 0.1607***
Oct  0.0945** 0.0879** 0.0957*** 0.0742*** 0.0482* 0.1908*** -0.0365 0.0137 0.0895***
Nov  0.0140 0.0888** 0.0319 0.0834*** 0.0311 0.1589*** 0.0264 0.0700*** 0.1206***
IMR0  - PCI -0.7795* 0.5696 -0.1959 -0.1536 0.0035 0.1766 -0.2522 -0.5481*** -0.4976***
Constant 4.2005*** 3.5923*** 4.1968*** 3.6976*** 3.5055*** 3.0236*** 3.5466*** 3.4960*** 3.4379***
Hospital sites Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Panel  C - 1st Stage Probit for Choice of procedure: CABG vs PCI – Eq. (3)
Differential distance of ﬁrst 3
hospitals by procedure
-0.0016*** 0.0001 -0.0013*** -0.0008** -0.0004 0.0009*** -0.0003 -0.0008** -0.0020***
EDI  income 1st quintile (most
deprived)
0.1810*** 0.0191 0.0173 0.0338 0.0295 -0.0008 -0.0030 -0.0087 -0.0053
EDI  income 2nd quintile 0.1254*** 0.0314 -0.0024 0.0543** 0.0077 0.0148 0.0281 0.0139 0.0104
EDI  income 3rd quintile 0.0909*** 0.0016 -0.0176 0.0314 -0.0171 0.0252 -0.0014 0.0039 -0.0300
EDI  income 4th quintile 0.0636*** -0.0210 -0.0177 0.0612*** 0.0017 -0.0050 -0.0284 0.0013 0.0282
Patient age 0.0096*** 0.0091*** 0.0102*** 0.0094*** 0.0094*** 0.0005 0.0085*** 0.0029 -0.0023
age  range 0-39 years -0.3061*** -0.3015*** -0.2823** -0.0918 -0.2956** -0.1060 -0.0210 -0.1426 -0.2199*
age  range 40-49 years -0.1636*** -0.1351** -0.1334** -0.1088* -0.0825 -0.2347*** -0.0359 -0.1776*** -0.2276***
age  range 50-59 years -0.0861*** -0.0658** -0.0578** -0.0711** -0.0701** -0.1090*** -0.0546* -0.1055*** -0.0717**
age  range 70-79 years 0.0099 0.0389 -0.0149 0.0015 0.0198 0.0730** -0.0302 0.0368 0.0237
age  range over 80 years -0.4070*** -0.3829*** -0.4832*** -0.4627*** -0.3756*** -0.2170*** -0.4207*** -0.3631*** -0.2711***
Female patient -0.3128*** -0.3407*** -0.3598*** -0.3203*** -0.3436*** -0.2886*** -0.3388*** -0.3389*** -0.3068***
Number of Comorbidities 0.1192*** 0.1102*** 0.1179*** 0.1146*** 0.1364*** 0.1424*** 0.1585*** 0.1627*** 0.1825***
Past  Year Emergency Admissions -0.1505*** -0.1284*** -0.1145*** -0.1025*** -0.1258*** -0.1301*** -0.1373*** -0.1199*** -0.1901***
Congestive Heart Failure 0.7357*** 0.6994*** 0.6561*** 0.6886*** 0.3365*** 0.2807*** 0.2487*** -0.0469 -0.0245
Peripheral Vascular Disease 0.1660*** 0.1429*** 0.0671** 0.0399 0.0312 -0.0751** -0.0165 0.0560* -0.0043
Cerebrovascular Disease 0.6004*** 0.5050*** 0.6662*** 0.6712*** 0.3980*** 0.4536*** 0.4553*** 0.3974*** 0.2798***
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Table G3 (Continued)
Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary
Disease (COPD)
-0.0492 -0.1334*** -0.0756*** -0.0586** -0.0882*** -0.0653** -0.1185*** -0.1476*** -0.1198***
Rheumatoid Disease -0.0460 -0.0771 -0.1470* -0.0314 -0.2366*** -0.0634 -0.0288 -0.0177 -0.1789***
Peptic Ulcer Disease 0.1149 0.0838 0.1864 0.3119** 0.1442 0.2019 0.0638 0.0650 0.3818***
Mild  Liver Disease -0.2714 0.2168 -0.2847 -0.2433 -0.2328 -0.1994 -0.1881 -0.0861 -0.3578**
Diabetes 0.0296 0.0619*** -0.0206 -0.0141 0.0177 -0.0420** -0.0940*** -0.1141*** -0.1046***
Diabetes + Complications -0.1639 0.0134 -0.1407 -0.0527 0.1056 -0.0912 -0.0885 -0.1153 -0.1557**
Renal  Disease 0.0087 -0.1425*** -0.0434 -0.1127** -0.1432*** -0.1507*** -0.1247*** -0.1004*** -0.1710***
Cancer  -0.1327 -0.2029** -0.3627*** -0.1917** -0.3282*** -0.1432* -0.1341* -0.0907 -0.2581***
Jan  0.0011 0.0359 0.0870** 0.0649* 0.0191 0.0380 -0.0091 0.0801** 0.0472
Feb  -0.0023 -0.0191 0.0230 -0.0249 -0.0051 -0.0182 0.0183 0.0011 0.0071
Mar  -0.0244 -0.0261 0.0774** -0.0354 -0.0099 -0.0516 0.0021 -0.0347 0.0378
April  0.1100*** 0.1770*** 0.0413 -0.0352 0.0594 -0.0954** -0.0161 -0.0066 0.1301***
May  0.0501 0.1459*** 0.1645*** 0.0883** 0.0361 -0.1696*** 0.0395 0.0379 0.1868***
June  0.0601 0.0979*** 0.1020*** 0.0204 -0.0007 -0.1454*** 0.0610* 0.0794** 0.1711***
July  0.0587 0.0347 0.0441 -0.0005 0.0762** -0.1033*** 0.0492 0.0142 0.1117***
Aug  0.0606 0.0589 0.0898** -0.0001 0.0498 -0.0688* 0.1093*** 0.0851** 0.2552***
Sept  0.0842** 0.1114*** 0.0758** -0.0408 -0.0005 -0.0481 0.0842** 0.0443 0.1607***
Oct  0.0054 -0.0101 0.0972*** 0.0445 0.0378 -0.0136 0.0089 -0.0467 0.0972**
Nov  0.0098 -0.0087 -0.0069 -0.0504 0.0028 -0.0564 0.0394 -0.0301 0.1075***
-0.
N . (4) an
R
B
B
B
B
B
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
D
F
GConstant -0.0714** -0.1671*** -0.3132*** 
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